The Secretary of State for Business and Trade v Alexander David Greensill

Where costs are payable subject to detailed assessment, the usual order is a reasonable payment on account unless there is good reason to withhold it. A deliberate decision not to seek such an order earlier is a relevant discretionary factor. The court may make a rough assessment of the recoverable proportion, allowing a margin for error. A possible future set-off carries little weight where the paying party is solvent and able to repay any excess. For disqualification under section 6 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, causation between the director’s conduct and the company’s insolvency is a factor relevant to unfitness and the period of disqualification, not a jurisdictional prerequisite. Permission to appeal requires a real prospect of success or another compelling reason. A stay depends on the risk of injustice in all the circumstances.

The judgment determined consequential matters arising from the court’s earlier judgment, [2026] EWHC 639 (Ch), concerning proceedings under the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. The parties disagreed about the Secretary of State’s entitlement to a payment on account of costs, the defendant’s proposed set-off, permission to appeal the court’s construction of section 6, and a stay pending appeal or a further costs application.

The central issues were whether there was good reason not to make the usual payment-on-account order, whether the defendant had a real prospect of success on the proposed appeal, and whether enforcement should be stayed.

1. Payment on account. Under CPR 44.2(8), an order for costs subject to detailed assessment ordinarily carries an order for a reasonable sum on account unless there is good reason to refuse it. The fact that a sealed costs order did not include such payment does not itself prevent a later application. However, the court retains a discretion, and a deliberate earlier decision not to seek payment is relevant. The agreed deletion of the proposed provision meant that any later application might be barred by contract, estoppel or waiver, and in any event was uncertain.
2. A possible future set-off may be relevant to the discretion. It was not a weighty factor here because the Secretary of State was solvent, could pay any costs order when due, and could repay any excess. The court therefore ordered payment on account.
3. For quantum, the court adopted a rough and ready assessment, considering the likely division of work between issues and allowing a substantial margin for error. The appropriate amount was £63,000.
4. Permission to appeal. The proposed appeal repeated arguments already rejected. The court remained satisfied that section 6 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 did not require the Secretary of State to allege and prove that the director’s conduct caused or was responsible for the company’s insolvency. Causation was instead a factor relevant to unfitness and the length of disqualification. There was no real prospect of success and no other compelling reason. Permission was refused under CPR 52.6(1).
5. Stay. The court applied the approach in Hammond Suddard Solicitors v Agrichem International Holdings Ltd, asking whether refusing or granting a stay created a risk of injustice. An appeal did not itself justify a stay under CPR 52.16. There was no evidence that enforcement would stifle the appeal or that the Secretary of State could not repay the money. Nor was it just to defer payment pending an unissued and contentious application for a further payment on account. The stay applications were refused.

The judgment concerned consequential applications following the court’s earlier judgment, [2026] EWHC 639 (Ch). It was a first-instance decision on payment on account, permission to appeal and a stay.