Hanna Grzelczak v General Dental Council

On an appeal by way of rehearing against a professional disciplinary sanction, the High Court must make its own evaluative assessment of whether the sanction is appropriate and necessary in the public interest, while giving the tribunal proper but not undue respect.

Erasure is reserved for misconduct causing serious harm, presenting a continuing risk of serious harm, or being fundamentally incompatible with continued registration so that no lesser sanction will suffice. Repetition, limited insight, a serious departure from professional standards and an attitudinal concern are relevant but not determinative. The tribunal must assess whether the concern is entrenched or irremediable and must explain its reasoning on remediation, risk and proportionality.

A Professional Conduct Committee of the General Dental Council found that Hanna Grzelczak had committed misconduct through four racially motivated emails sent to former colleagues and that her fitness to practise was impaired. On 24 September 2025 it directed that her name be erased from the register.

Ms Grzelczak appealed under section 29(1)(a)(i) of the Dentists Act 1984, challenging the assessment of harm, repetition, insight, remediation and proportionality. The central issue was whether erasure was appropriate and necessary in the public interest, or excessive and disproportionate.

1. Appeal and jurisdiction. The appeal was allowed. Under section 29 of the Dentists Act 1984 and CPR 52D, paragraph 19.1, the appeal was by way of rehearing. The court was entitled to undertake its own evaluative assessment and substitute its judgment, while giving proper, though not undue, respect to the Tribunal’s expertise and findings. This differed from the narrower review jurisdiction considered in General Medical Council v Bawa-Garba.
2. Insight and remediation. The Tribunal was entitled to find that the appellant’s insight was limited. That did not establish the persistent lack of insight contemplated by the Sanctions Guidance as pointing towards erasure. The evidence did not show an entrenched or enduring refusal to acknowledge wrongdoing. The Tribunal had also failed adequately to explain its finding of shortcomings in remediation and had not fairly assessed the evidence of completed CPD and continued reflective work.
3. Risk and seriousness of harm. Limited insight could increase the risk of repetition but was not determinative. The evidence, passage of time, admissions, remediation and likely deterrent effect of suspension indicated a reduced risk of repetition. In any event, the Tribunal had identified only a general risk of harm, not actual serious harm or a continuing risk of serious harm of the kind contemplated by the Sanctions Guidance for erasure. The communications were offensive and racially motivated, but did not involve patients, clinical care, patient safety or a comparable risk of serious physical or psychological harm.
4. Proportionality and substituted sanction. A serious departure from professional standards and the repeated nature of the misconduct did not, without more, make erasure necessary. Erasure requires conduct fundamentally incompatible with continued registration, including an entrenched or irremediable attitudinal concern, or circumstances in which no lesser sanction protects the public and wider public interest. A six-month suspension was appropriate and necessary, subject to a review hearing. The appellant was required to provide further evidence of CPD, reflective learning and insight.

The judgment does not state the citation of any earlier court decision in the same litigation. The appeal was brought to the High Court under section 29 of the Dentists Act 1984 against the Professional Conduct Committee’s sanction of erasure.