R v Bhipon Chahal

For remuneration purposes, a Newton hearing takes place where the sentencing court determines disputed issues of fact that materially affect sentence. A defendant’s decision not to give evidence, or an expressed wish not to proceed with a Newton hearing, does not by itself prevent that conclusion.

The court must examine the sentencing remarks and the factual issues actually resolved. The distinction is between factual findings and the assessment of undisputed facts or mitigation. Where the sentencing decision reflects findings about matters such as role, duration, involvement and the scale of offending, the work is remunerable by a trial fee rather than a guilty plea fee.

The appellant appealed against a redetermination of remuneration arising from criminal proceedings in which the defendant pleaded guilty to three drug conspiracy counts. A detailed basis of plea was disputed by the prosecution. A five-day Newton hearing was listed twice but did not proceed as a conventional evidential hearing.

The defendant was sentenced after submissions, including expert evidence concerning the nature of the drug enterprise and his role in it. The Determining Officer treated the work as attracting a guilty plea fee. The appellant argued that the sentencing court had nevertheless resolved factual disputes and that a trial fee was payable. The respondent maintained that the surviving issues were mitigation only and that no Newton hearing had taken place.

1. Appeal allowed in part. The travel-expenses issue had already been settled. The remaining appeal succeeded, and remuneration was ordered on the basis of a trial fee rather than a guilty plea fee.
2. The defendant’s statement that he did not wish to proceed with a Newton hearing did not determine whether one had taken place. The surrounding context showed that he continued to challenge the prosecution’s assertions that he had a leading role and had participated throughout the conspiracy.
3. The relevant question was whether the sentencing court determined issues of fact, rather than merely assessing undisputed facts by way of mitigation. The sentencing remarks showed that the court considered the duration of the conspiracy, quantities of drugs, sophistication and persistence of the enterprise, use of EncroChat, proximity to importation, the defendant’s period of involvement, and whether his role was managerial, leading or lesser.
4. The distinction drawn in R v Shehu [2023] EWHC 3483 (SCCO) between findings of fact and the interpretation or inference drawn from undisputed facts was helpful, but the respondent had not shown that the material questions were merely interpretative.
5. The sentencing judge’s reduction of the starting point by three years to reflect a lesser role, alongside other reductions for mitigation and the guilty plea, demonstrated that factual findings materially affected sentence. The expert evidence had not been wholly disregarded merely because the sentencing judge was unimpressed by it.
6. The case was more analogous to R v Badibanga [2025] EWHC 89 (SCCO) and R v Williams [2024] EWHC 3159 (SCCO) than to the authorities relied upon by the respondent. The appellant was awarded £900 plus the £100 appeal fee.

1. Senior Courts Costs Office: The Determining Officer refused remuneration by reference to a trial fee and treated a guilty plea fee as appropriate. The appellant appealed against that redetermination.
2. High Court (Senior Court Costs Office): The travel-expenses ground had already been resolved. The remaining appeal was allowed, with remuneration assessed on the basis of a trial fee.