Narinder Singh, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Post-permission strike out in judicial review is exceptional. A claim should be struck out for academicity only where a clear-cut reason shows that no live dispute affecting rights or obligations remains. A mandatory fee-warning procedure must be followed before automatic strike out for non-payment can occur; otherwise the court should apply the Denton principles.

A waiver signed by a departing immigration claimant is not an informed discontinuance where its legal effect was not explained in a language understood by the claimant. It is not ordinarily an adequate substitute for Form N279. Cancellation of entry clearance for deception requires evidence of deliberate dishonesty, precise notification of the allegation, a fair opportunity to respond, and reasonable enquiries. Immigration detention must be a last resort, supported by accurate facts and consideration of alternatives.

The claimant arrived in the United Kingdom with visitor entry clearance. Immigration officers questioned him, cancelled his entry clearance on the basis of alleged false representations, refused him entry and detained him for 19 days.

After permission for judicial review had been granted, the Secretary of State sought to strike out the claim because the claimant had not paid the post-permission fee promptly, had left the United Kingdom, and had signed a departure waiver indicating withdrawal. The claimant maintained that he wished to pursue the claim and that the waiver had not been explained to him in a language he understood.

The issues were whether the claim should be struck out, whether the entry-clearance cancellation was lawful, and whether the detention complied with the statutory and public-law limits on immigration detention.

1. Strike out for non-payment of the fee. Automatic strike out under CPR 3.7(1)(d) was unavailable because the court had not served the mandatory warning notice. Although the breach was serious, applying the Denton principles and considering all the circumstances, strike out under CPR 3.4(2)(c) was disproportionate. The claimant acted promptly once contacted, remission was realistically available, and the Secretary of State suffered no material prejudice.
2. Academicity and waiver. The claim remained live because cancellation of entry clearance could trigger a ten-year refusal period under the Immigration Rules. The departure waiver had no legal effect. It had not been explained in a language the claimant understood, and even an informed waiver would not readily substitute for Form N279, which identifies the proceedings and explains potential costs consequences. The claim was neither abusive nor properly discontinued.
3. Cancellation of entry clearance. Paragraph 2A of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971 and paragraph 9.7.3 of the Immigration Rules permit cancellation for deliberate false representations or non-disclosure, but the guidance requires evidence of deception, consideration of innocent mistake, precise notification of the allegation and a reasonable opportunity to respond. The Canadian visa omission was capable of an innocent explanation. The officers failed to question the sponsor, who was the person said to have made the relevant representation, and failed to explain why the claimant’s explanation was rejected.
4. The alleged employment discrepancy was not rationally capable of establishing deception and was not fairly put. The alleged falsity of the bank statements was an impermissible ex post facto justification, was not identified in the cancellation notice, and was not put to either the claimant or the sponsor. The cancellation decision was therefore unlawful for unfairness, inadequate enquiry and irrationality.
5. Detention. Detention for examination was not challenged and was initially justifiable. Detention following cancellation was unlawful because it implemented an unlawful decision. Independently, the detention reviews relied materially on egregious factual errors, including that the claimant had evaded immigration control and was pursuing administrative review, and failed meaningfully to consider release on conditions. The detention was unlawful.
6. The court declined to strike out the claim and refused permission to treat the waiver as a notice of discontinuance. It declared the entry-clearance cancellation and detention unlawful and sought submissions on an order ensuring that the decisions had no continuing adverse effect.

First-instance judicial review in the High Court (Administrative Court). Permission was granted by Deputy High Court Judge Pilgerstorfer on 25 November 2025 after transfer from the Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber.