Jim Peter Grant and two others v Glenda Jackman and three others (Trinidad and Tobago)

Section 16(1) of the Registration of Deeds Act of Trinidad and Tobago creates a general priority rule for every registrable deed affecting land. Priority is determined by the time of registration and operates against every other deed, including an unregistered deed. The rule applies to voluntary deeds and vesting assents. It is not confined to purchasers or gifts. Section 16(2) provides separate protection for subsequent purchasers for value and mortgagees without notice and does not restrict section 16(1). An earlier conveyance therefore does not defeat a later deed registered first merely because the grantor had previously conveyed the land.

Before the Board, the Beneficiaries appealed against the Court of Appeal’s decision concerning ownership of residential property in Trinidad and Tobago. The property had been conveyed to Bovell in 1979, but that conveyance was not registered until December 2014. After the original owner’s death, his executor executed a deed of assent in favour of the Beneficiaries, which was registered in June 2014. The Grants later purchased and registered their conveyance in August 2015.

The trial judge held that the 1979 Conveyance was valid but that the Assent had priority under section 16(1) of the Registration of Deeds Act of Trinidad and Tobago. The Court of Appeal reversed that conclusion, treating the Assent as incapable of defeating an earlier conveyance because it was voluntary. The central issues were whether section 16(1) applies to volunteers and whether the nemo dat principle prevents priority based on registration.

Appeal allowed. The Board reinstated the order of Ramcharan J, subject to points of detail being addressed in writing.

1. Section 16(1). The provision operates in three stages. It requires registration of every deed by which land may be affected at law or in equity. It gives every duly registered deed effect according to the priority of its registration. That priority operates against every other deed, conveyance or disposition of the land, including an unregistered deed. The language does not support a distinction between purchasers and volunteers, or between voluntary deeds and deeds for value.
2. Vesting assents and nemo dat. A vesting assent is part of the chain of title and falls within the registration scheme. The phrase referring to the right, title and interest of the person conveying the land does not impose a nemo dat quod non habet limitation. If delivery of the first conveyance exhausted the grantor’s title, priority would depend on delivery rather than registration and the statutory scheme would be destroyed. The reasoning in Warburton v Loveland (1831–32) 2 Dow & Clark 480, although described as obiter, was compelling. The narrow possible exception for successive charges could not save the respondents’ argument.
3. Section 16(2). Section 16(2) is a separate form of protection for subsequent purchasers for value and mortgagees without notice. It may produce a different result from section 16(1), as illustrated by Ramdeo Mahabir v Payne (1979) 33 WIR 268. The reference to purchasers in section 16(2) cannot be used to restrict the wider priority rule in section 16(1), which applies to all registrable deeds.
4. Purpose and settled authority. The historical authorities, including Bushell v Bushell [1803] Cases in Chancery 90 and Drew v Lord Norbury [1846] Cases in Equity 171, established the registration-based approach under the Irish legislation. The registration scheme’s fundamental objective is to make the register a complete source for investigating title. Voluntary deeds, including assents, must therefore be registered and receive the statutory priority attached to registration. The reference to bona fide purchasers concerns fraud, not a purchaser-only limitation.
5. Application. The Assent was registered before the 1979 Conveyance. It consequently had priority under section 16(1), and the Beneficiaries were entitled to the declaration of ownership and possession ordered at trial. Sympathy for the Grants and the unexplained failure to discover the Assent did not justify a strained statutory construction.

• Privy Council: Allowed the Beneficiaries’ appeal and reinstated the order of Ramcharan J, subject to points of detail.
• Court of Appeal of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago: By a unanimous judgment given on 24 May 2024, allowed the Grants’ appeal and held that the Assent could not defeat the valid 1979 Conveyance because it was not a deed for valuable consideration.
• High Court: On 16 January 2019, Ramcharan J held that the 1979 Conveyance validly transferred the property but that the Assent took priority because it was registered first under section 16(1). The Grants received monetary relief, but the Beneficiaries were declared owners and obtained possession.