JB v Disclosure and Barring Service

A statutory barred-list appeal is confined to mistakes of law or fact; the Upper Tribunal cannot reconsider whether barring was appropriate. A factual mistake warrants intervention only if it materially contributed to the DBS decision. The Tribunal may assess the evidence before it, including later evidence and oral testimony. Criminal proceedings are relevant evidence, but an acquittal or discontinuance does not itself determine whether the facts are established on the balance of probabilities.

The DBS included JB, a paramedic, in the adults’ and children’s barred lists after making findings about alleged conduct towards two former partners, Victim 1 and Victim 3. It did not substantiate allegations concerning Victim 2, another former partner.

JB challenged the factual findings, relying on text messages, his account of Victim 3’s alleged withdrawal of a statement, and the outcomes of criminal proceedings. He had been acquitted of an assault charge concerning Victim 1; proceedings concerning Victim 3 had been discontinued. Permission to appeal was granted after an initial refusal. The central issue was whether the DBS had made a mistake of law or a material mistake of fact in reaching its findings.

1. The appeal was dismissed. Under the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act, the Tribunal could intervene only for a mistake of law or fact. It had no jurisdiction to decide whether barring was appropriate. The panel applied the factual-appeal approach summarised in PF v DBS [2020] UKUT 256 (AAC), considering the evidence available at the hearing, including JB’s oral evidence and material not before the DBS.

2. The acquittal concerning Victim 1 was relevant but not determinative. The panel considered the District Judge’s recorded reasons alongside the evidence before it. The criminal standard was proof beyond reasonable doubt; the relevant factual assessment was on the balance of probabilities. The panel applied the principle restated in Re B (Children) [2008] UKHL 35: seriousness does not alter that standard, although inherent probabilities may be relevant. It concluded that the acquittal and the text messages did not establish a DBS mistake. It also rejected the appellant’s reliance on paragraph 4 of R (Wright) v Secretary of State for Health [2009] UKHL 3 as support for his argument.

3. For Victim 3, the evidence did not corroborate JB’s assertion that she had admitted lying and withdrawn her statement. The panel found her evidence credible and his alternative account unconvincing. The DBS was not obliged to investigate why the prosecution had been discontinued; it was for JB to produce evidence supporting his claim of factual error. On the material available, the findings concerning Victim 3 involved no material mistake.

4. The panel found no material factual mistake concerning any of the three findings and no mistake of law. The appellant accepted that, if no factual mistake had been made, the barring decision would not be disproportionate. The weight of the findings and JB’s safeguarding actions went to appropriateness, which was outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction under section 4(3). The DBS decision was upheld and the appeal dismissed.

1. Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber): Appeal dismissed after a hearing on 11 June 2026. Permission had initially been refused on the papers by Upper Tribunal Judge Wikeley and was later granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Brewer after an oral hearing.
2. Disclosure and Barring Service: By a decision dated 28 March 2022, included JB in the adults’ and children’s barred lists on grounds of relevant conduct.