Yitzchok Feiner v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions

For a joint claim, the work condition in the Universal Credit Regulations 2013 requires the non-working member to be unable to provide childcare because of their regular and substantial caring responsibilities for a severely disabled person. Carer status alone is insufficient. The question is whether those responsibilities prevent the person from providing childcare; the assessment-period structure does not remove that requirement. Whether particular activities amount to caring, and whether they prevent childcare, depends on the evidence and the circumstances.

Mr Feiner and his partner were joint claimants of Universal Credit. His partner worked, while Mr Feiner cared for their severely disabled child, Z, and received carer’s allowance. The couple sought the childcare costs element for Z and five other children. The children attended different institutions, but their childcare hours substantially overlapped.

The Secretary of State refused the element because the work condition was not met. The First-tier Tribunal dismissed Mr Feiner’s appeal and refused permission to appeal. The Upper Tribunal granted permission. The central issue was whether Mr Feiner’s caring responsibilities made him unable to provide childcare, particularly when Z was in childcare during the same periods as the other children.

The appeal was dismissed.

1. Work condition. Regulation 32(1)(b) of the Universal Credit Regulations 2013 required Mr Feiner to show that he was unable to provide childcare because of his caring responsibilities. The provision had to be read as a whole: meeting the criteria for caring responsibilities did not, by itself, establish the required inability. The First-tier Tribunal was entitled to find that Mr Feiner was not prevented from providing childcare when Z was not being cared for during the hours the other children were in childcare ([15], [18]).
2. Assessment period and caring status. The reference to an assessment period identified the period for assessment and payment of Universal Credit. It did not alter how the entitlement conditions applied within that period ([16]). The Tribunal had not treated Mr Feiner’s caring status as ending whenever Z attended nursery. It had decided that the status did not prevent him providing childcare at the relevant times ([17]–[18]).
3. Activities and evidence. The Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 did not define caring for this purpose. Whether particular tasks amounted to caring was for the First-tier Tribunal to assess on the evidence. The Commissioner’s decision in CG/006/1990 concerned substantially more extensive preparation, aftercare and continuous care. The Tribunal could find that the activities described by Mr Feiner were less onerous and that its finding was open to it ([24]–[27]). Even if those activities amounted to caring, the Tribunal could conclude that they did not prevent childcare because they could be done at another time ([27]).
4. Other grounds. The First-tier Tribunal’s reasons adequately identified the facts and submissions, explained the interpretation it accepted and showed why the work condition was not met ([21]). DWP guidance was not binding and its example did not assist on these facts ([22]). The regulatory wording was clear; the judge did not need to consider the parties’ wider policy submissions, and the Tribunal’s approach was not inconsistent with the stated policy of supporting parents to return to and progress in work ([29]).

The judge also cautioned representatives who use AI to prepare submissions to verify that cited cases exist and support the propositions advanced ([31]).

• Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber): Permission to appeal granted; appeal dismissed.
• First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber): Dismissed the appeal against the refusal of the childcare costs element and refused permission to appeal. Decision dated 18 March 2025.