London Borough of Enfield v Teegan Edwards & Anor

For Part 3 of the Children and Families Act 2014, local-authority responsibility under section 24 depends on ordinary residence. The applicable test is whether the person has adopted a place voluntarily and for settled purposes as part of the regular order of life, applying R v Barnet LBC, ex p Shah as explained in R (Worcestershire County Council) v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care. Without a statutory rule disregarding local-authority placements, ordinary residence for special educational needs may differ from residence for social-care purposes. In a section 51 appeal, the First-tier Tribunal may, and where disputed must, determine which local authority is the proper respondent as part of its case-management jurisdiction.

Teegan Edwards, a young person with an education, health and care plan, appealed to the First-tier Tribunal about his special educational provision and placement. After moving from his mother’s home in Haringey to supported accommodation arranged by Haringey in Enfield, the First-tier Tribunal decided on 8 April 2025 that Enfield was the appropriate respondent and removed Haringey. Enfield appealed.

The Upper Tribunal considered whether responsibility under section 24 of the Children and Families Act 2014 follows the ordinary-residence approach used for social-care functions, and whether the First-tier Tribunal could decide which local authority was responsible in an appeal under section 51.

Appeal dismissed. The First-tier Tribunal was entitled to find that Edwards was ordinarily resident in Enfield when it made its decision.

1. First-tier Tribunal jurisdiction. There is no freestanding appeal to the First-tier Tribunal against a local authority’s decision about responsibility or a transfer under regulation 15 of the Special Educational Needs and Disability Regulations 2014. But in an appeal under section 51 of the Children and Families Act 2014, the Tribunal has jurisdiction to identify the proper respondent. Its powers to make orders against a local authority, together with its case-management power under rule 9 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Health, Education and Social Care Chamber) Rules 2008, require it to ensure that the authority responsible for the relevant assessment or plan can participate. Where the authorities dispute responsibility, the Tribunal must decide the issue itself. Proceeding against the wrong authority may make a decision unfair; substitution generally places the new respondent in the former respondent’s shoes.
2. Ordinary residence. Hampshire County Council v GC and anor establishes that section 24 uses ordinary residence rather than physical presence alone. The applicable test is the ordinary test in R v Barnet LBC, ex p Shah, as explained in R (Worcestershire County Council) v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care: residence is adopted voluntarily and for settled purposes as part of the regular order of life, even if for a limited period. A person with capacity may adopt local-authority accommodation voluntarily despite having no practical alternative. For someone without capacity, the relevant decision-maker’s state of mind supplies the mental elements of the test. Forced detention is an example of involuntary presence. The statutory deeming provisions in social-care legislation, considered in R (Cornwall Council) v Secretary of State for Health, do not apply to the special educational needs scheme. The local authority responsible for education may therefore differ from the authority responsible for social care.
3. Guidance and application. Whether a residential education placement changes ordinary residence depends on whether the person is living there or merely receiving education there. Temporary absences and emergency moves are unlikely to change residence; a move intended to last more than a school year will rarely be temporary. The question whether unlawful residence can count as ordinary residence under the 2014 Act was left open. Edwards had capacity, and there was no challenge to the finding that his supported accommodation in Enfield was not temporary or transitory. The First-tier Tribunal’s reference to Enfield’s recent participation was immaterial to its decision. If the parties cannot agree whether responsibility has since changed, the First-tier Tribunal must determine that issue at the next case-management hearing.

1. Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber): Appeal dismissed. The First-tier Tribunal’s decision that Enfield was the appropriate respondent when it was made was upheld.
2. First-tier Tribunal (Special Educational Needs and Disability): On 8 April 2025, decided that Edwards was ordinarily resident in Enfield and removed Haringey as a respondent.