Michael Stefan Duma v The Commissioners for HMRC

Permission to appeal from the First-tier Tribunal requires an arguable error of law that was material to the decision, with a realistic rather than fanciful prospect of success. Procedural fairness is assessed cumulatively by considering the hearing as a whole. A remote format, an agreed submissions-based procedure, or a party’s litigant-in-person status does not alone establish unfairness; the opportunity to present the case and the hearing’s overall conduct matter. A permission ground alleging that the Tribunal failed to decide a point not raised before it may be refused where allowing it would be procedurally unfair.

HMRC issued Notices of Requirement for PAYE and National Insurance contributions to Intech Ventures Limited, which was in liquidation, and Michael Stefan Duma. At a preliminary hearing, the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber) decided that Mr Duma’s appeal was late, refused to admit it out of time and gave no directions for a substantive hearing. The company did not participate.

The First-tier Tribunal refused permission to appeal. The Upper Tribunal also refused permission on the papers, after which Mr Duma sought reconsideration at an oral hearing. He pursued grounds alleging procedural unfairness, error in accepting the service officer’s evidence, failure to distinguish between the two Notices of Requirement, and failure to find the notice against him void because it included past debts. The issue was whether any ground showed an arguable, material error of law.

1. Permission threshold. Under section 11 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, an appeal from the First-tier Tribunal lies only on a point of law. Permission requires an arguable error of law material to the decision. An argument is arguable if it has a realistic, rather than fanciful, prospect of success. Mr Duma identified no such error.
2. Procedural fairness. Fairness is assessed cumulatively by considering the hearing as a whole. The Upper Tribunal applied the overall-fairness approach in Hima v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 680. The parties had agreed to a submissions-based format between a paper determination and a full evidential hearing. The First-tier Tribunal could select that format as part of its case-management powers. The hearing being remote, Mr Duma’s status as a litigant in person, and HMRC’s representation by counsel did not, without more, establish unfairness. The Tribunal heard submissions from Mr Duma and his McKenzie Friend, adopted an inquisitorial approach when gathering relevant information, and allowed them to provide speaking notes after the hearing.
3. Specific fairness complaints. The alleged criminal charge arose from non-payment of the Notice of Requirement, not from the preliminary hearing. Legal Aid was unavailable for the issues in that hearing; the Tribunal referred to Hackett v HMRC [2020] UKUT 212 and Article 6 of the EHCR. The judge accepted HMRC counsel’s evidence that he had not cross-examined Mr Duma. The remote format did not itself found unfairness where the parties had an adequate opportunity to make their points. Overall, the procedural-unfairness ground had no realistic prospect of success.
4. Remaining grounds. The alleged inconsistency between the service officer’s evidence and the record in Duma v HMRC [2026] UKFTT 262 was unarguable. Read as a whole, the First-tier Tribunal’s decision showed that it knew there were two Notices of Requirement. The argument that Mr Duma’s notice was void because it included past debts was not shown to have been raised below. Permission on that new point was refused: allowing it would be procedurally unfair and would allege error by the First-tier Tribunal for not taking a point that had not been put to it.

Following oral reconsideration, permission to appeal was refused. The earlier refusal on grounds no longer pursued remained in place.

• Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber): Refused permission to appeal following an oral reconsideration hearing. It had previously refused permission on the papers on 31 March 2026.
• First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber): In its preliminary decision, released on 26 November 2025, found Mr Duma’s appeal out of time, refused to admit it late and gave no directions for a substantive hearing. The First-tier Tribunal refused permission to appeal on 19 February 2026.