Hughes Family Property Co Ltd & Anor v Jonathan Marvin & Ors

Under section 84 of the Law of Property Act 1925, a restrictive covenant may be modified where it impedes reasonable use and the statutory conditions are met, including that it secures no practical benefits of substantial value or advantage, with money adequate for any loss. A benefit must be practical and substantial in the circumstances. A covenant’s contribution to neighbourhood appearance may be a practical benefit without being substantial; traffic, parking and precedent concerns must be assessed against the evidence. Establishing jurisdiction does not compel modification: the Tribunal retains a discretion, to be exercised cautiously and not as punishment for prior conduct unless that conduct is egregious and unconscionable. A separate ground is available where the proposed modification will not injure those entitled to the covenant’s benefit.

The applicants owned land forming part of the garden of 28 Redwalls Meadow, Dartmouth. They had planning permission for a house on the land, but a restrictive covenant prevented any building there. The objectors were owners of neighbouring homes said to benefit from the covenant. The applicants sought its modification under grounds (aa) and (c) of section 84 of the Law of Property Act 1925. The Tribunal considered whether the proposed house was a reasonable use, whether the covenant secured practical benefits of substantial value or advantage, whether the modification would injure the objectors, and whether it should exercise its discretion to modify the covenant.

1. The application was allowed. The Tribunal found that building the permissioned house was a reasonable use of the land and that the covenant impeded that use. It structured its analysis by the questions used in Re Bass Ltd’s Application (1973) 26 P&CR 156.

2. Preserving the appearance of Redwalls Meadow was a practical benefit of the covenant, but it was not of substantial value or advantage. The proposed house was modest, would be less prominent than nearby houses, and would have limited overlooking effects. The evidence did not establish a practical benefit concerning traffic or parking: access was from Mount Boone, and there was no evidence that traffic would use the Redwalls Meadow cul-de-sac. The possibility of encouraging other development was too remote; a separate site would be assessed on its own facts.

3. The applicants accepted that they could not establish that impeding the proposed use was contrary to the public interest. The application succeeded under ground (aa) because the covenant did not secure practical benefits of substantial value or advantage. The Tribunal nevertheless found ground (c) satisfied on the applicants’ amenity submissions. The applicants had relied on Teagle’s Application (1963) 14 P. & C.R. 68 for the criterion concerning injury from the proposed modification.

4. Jurisdiction did not require the Tribunal to grant relief. It referred to Ridley v Taylor [1965] 1 W.L.R. 611 for the direction that discretion must relate to the property and its history, and to The Trustees of The Green Masjid and Madrasah [2013] UKUT 0355 (LC) for the cautious approach to refusing relief as punishment for an applicant’s conduct. The Tribunal had set out its approach to prior breaches in Carl Edward Williams v Aaron John Thompson-Hall & Ors [2026] UKUT 260 (LC). Here, the applicants’ conduct may have had a pecuniary motive but was not egregious and unconscionable, so the Tribunal exercised its discretion to allow the application.

5. The valuation report was not compliant expert evidence and was given no weight. The objectors’ compensation claims were unsupported; any amenity loss was too slight to quantify, and no other basis for compensation was established. No compensation was awarded. The covenant was modified to permit development under the planning permission, including qualifying renewals and amendments, provided the applicants signified acceptance of the modification within three months.