East Riding of Yorkshire Council v Sienna Bowers

Special educational provision must have a sufficient nexus with the child or young person’s special educational needs. The needs identified in Section B of an EHC plan must call for, and require by reason of those needs, the provision specified in Section F. A tribunal must determine the provision required by the needs before allocating activities or hours to an educational package. Provision may qualify as special educational provision in one case but not another, depending on the individual’s needs. Where Section F must be reconsidered, Section I may also require reconsideration because its contents depend on the provision determined under Section F.

The local authority appealed against a First-tier Tribunal decision concerning an 18-year-old with a severe language disorder and developmental vulnerabilities. The First-tier Tribunal had ordered an education-other-than-in-school-or-college package including English and Maths tuition, golf coaching and practice, gym training, and related support in Section F of her EHC plan. It left Section I blank.

The appeal concerned whether the golf and gym provision was special educational provision required by the respondent’s special educational needs, and whether the tribunal had given adequate reasons for including it. The Upper Tribunal also considered late evidence and the appropriate disposal of the appeal.

Appeal allowed. The First-tier Tribunal had erred in law by ordering golf coaching, golf practice and gym provision in Section F without establishing the necessary nexus with the respondent’s special educational needs.

1. Statutory connection. Section F must set out the special educational provision required. Special educational provision is educational or training provision additional to, or different from, that generally made for others of the same age. The statutory definition of special educational needs requires a learning difficulty or disability which calls for special educational provision. The provision in Section F must therefore be called for by, and required by reason of, the needs recorded in Section B.
2. Application. The First-tier Tribunal did not explain how the respondent’s severe language disability, developmental gap or vulnerability called for the golf and gym provision. The provision instead catered for areas of strength. On the facts, the connection was too tenuous, and no reasonable tribunal could rationally have found the required nexus.
3. Scope. Golf or gym provision is not incapable in every case of being special educational provision. Its status depends on the particular young person’s special educational needs and what those needs call for or require.
4. Arguments and evidence. The nexus issue was not a new point of law. Specialist status did not prevent appellate intervention where the tribunal had misdirected itself in law. The Upper Tribunal declined to admit late evidence under the Ladd v Marshall principles, and held that it would not have altered the result.
5. Remittal. The decision was set aside as regards Sections F and I. Section F required holistic reconsideration of the provision called for by the needs in Section B. Section I also had to be reconsidered because the contents of Section F had to be known before applying section 61. The request to preserve the golf and gym provision pending rehearing was refused.

• Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber) allowed the local authority’s appeal against the First-tier Tribunal decision, set aside the decision concerning Sections F and I, and remitted those matters to a fresh First-tier Tribunal panel.
• First-Tier Tribunal (HESC Chamber) Special Educational Needs and Disability Tribunal determined the appeal on 18 March 2025 and ordered amendments to Section B and Section F, including golf and gym provision, while leaving Section I blank.