Jordan Lyden v The Commissioners for HMRC

Permission to appeal from a refusal to admit a late tax appeal requires an arguable error of law with a realistic prospect of success. A challenge to the first tribunal’s weighting of factors in a multi-factor assessment is insufficient where it identifies no irrelevant factor or omitted relevant matter.

Reasons should be proportionate to the significance and complexity of the issues. The difference between the time limits applying to taxpayers and HMRC forms part of the statutory scheme and is not, by itself, a factor in deciding whether to admit a late appeal.

Mr Lyden sought to appeal against a First-tier Tribunal decision refusing his request to bring a late appeal from closure notices determining increased income tax liabilities for two tax years. The Commissioners of His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) were the respondent. Mr Lyden’s notice was more than four months late. He relied on his accountant’s illness and subsequent workload, his own career-ending injury and mental-health difficulties, and an extended stay in Australia.

The FTT found that the reasons did not justify the delay and refused to admit the appeal. It refused permission to appeal on 12 June 2025. The Upper Tribunal had refused permission on paper on 21 July 2026. After an oral renewal, the question was whether any of four grounds had a realistic prospect of showing material error of law, including failures to assess the reasons holistically, weigh prejudice, scrutinise the merits, give adequate reasons, or account for differing appeal deadlines.

The application for permission to appeal was refused.

1. Permission threshold. Section 11(1) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 provides an appeal to the Upper Tribunal on a point of law. Permission should be granted on a ground only if it is arguable, with a realistic prospect of success, that the FTT made a material error of law.

2. Weight of factors. Grounds 1 and 2 challenged the FTT’s application of the Martland principles and the weight it gave to the evidence. The FTT had considered the reasons for delay and the prejudice to Mr Lyden. The Upper Tribunal found no basis to say that it had considered irrelevant matters or ignored relevant ones. Disagreement with the weight assigned to relevant factors did not give these grounds a realistic prospect of success.

3. Underlying merits. The FTT had not accepted HMRC’s submission that the underlying appeal was bound to fail, but Mr Lyden had not persuaded it that his case was very strong. It was open to the FTT to conclude that the likely merits did not weigh strongly either way. This part of ground 3 had no realistic prospect of success.

4. Adequacy of reasons. The FTT’s decision set out the law, the parties’ submissions and its reasons. The Senior President’s Practice Direction on Reasons for Decisions required proportionate reasons and did not require tribunals to elaborate at length or explain every step of their reasoning. The FTT’s reasons met that standard, so there was no arguable error.

5. Different appeal time limits. The fact that taxpayers face a 30-day limit to appeal against closure notices or assessments while HMRC is not subject to the same strict limit forms part of the statutory scheme. It was not, by itself, a factor in the Martland assessment. None of the grounds had a realistic prospect of success, and permission was refused.

• Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber) Refused permission on paper on 21 July 2026. Following an oral hearing of the renewed application on 25 August 2026, refused permission; the decision was issued on 26 August 2026.
• First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber) Refused Mr Lyden’s application to bring a late appeal against closure notices on 13 February 2025 and refused permission to appeal on 12 June 2025.