Animal Equality v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs

Under Article 6(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs, a product’s “true origin” means its geographical origin. It does not include the methods used to produce it. The phrase must be read with the Regulation’s definition of a geographical indication, which connects a product’s qualities and production steps to a defined geographical area.

A legitimate interest in opposing an application need not be economic. It may include an interest in promoting consumers’ interests where that interest relates to matters governed by the Regulation. Whether the interest is genuine and more than hypothetical depends on the evidence.

Salmon Scotland, a trade body representing the Scottish salmon industry, applied to change the protected geographical indication “Scottish Farmed Salmon” to “Scottish Salmon”. The Secretary of State approved the amendment. Animal Equality, an animal-rights organisation that campaigns for farmed-animal welfare and consumer protection, opposed the application. The First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber (Information Rights)) dismissed its appeal in case FD/2024/0002 on 21 January 2025.

Animal Equality appealed to the Upper Tribunal on the meaning of “true origin” in Article 6(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012. The Secretary of State sought permission to cross-appeal on the timing and scope of the legitimate-interest requirement, and on whether Animal Equality met it. The central question was whether “true origin” includes production methods as well as geographical origin.

1. The appeal was dismissed, and the Secretary of State’s application for permission to cross-appeal was refused. On the first cross-appeal issue, the timing of the Secretary of State’s assessment of legitimate interest did not determine whether the First-tier Tribunal had erred in law. Its jurisdictional concern was whether the appellant had a legitimate interest, not when the Secretary of State assessed that question. That was sufficient to refuse permission on that ground.

2. The Upper Tribunal’s further view that the First-tier Tribunal must assess legitimate interest retrospectively, at the time the notice of opposition was lodged, was expressly obiter. The appeal right under Annex 1B concerns a person who lodges a valid notice under Article 51(1); the judge considered that a person without a legitimate interest could not legally lodge such a notice. The judge also considered that the procedure assumes the same person proceeds from notice to reasoned statement. The timing observations did not affect the refusal of permission.

3. The First-tier Tribunal did not arguably err in law by holding that “legitimate interest” can include an interest in promoting consumers’ interests. The interest must relate to the matters governed by the Regulation and the relevant application, but the text and scheme did not support restricting it to economic interests. The Upper Tribunal relied on the broad approach in Hengstenberg GmbH & Co. KG v Spreewaldverein eV (Case C-53/20), while explaining that the CJEU’s answer about economic effect addressed the question put to it and did not make economic impact an exhaustive requirement. Whether a particular person has a legitimate interest is an evidence-based assessment; the interest cannot be merely hypothetical.

4. It was also not arguable that the First-tier Tribunal erred in finding that Animal Equality had such an interest. The Secretary of State’s contention that Animal Equality’s true motive was political opposition to the product had not been advanced below. A disagreement with the First-tier Tribunal’s evaluative conclusion, or a new factual argument, did not establish an error of law.

5. On the principal appeal, Article 6(2) was read in the context of Article 5(2) and the Regulation’s objectives. A geographical indication identifies a product by reference to a defined place, region or country; the product’s characteristics and production steps are linked to that geographical origin. They do not themselves define its origin. Article 6(3) did not provide a material contrast. The phrase “true origin” therefore concerns geographical origin and does not extend to methods of production. The CJEU authorities cited did not require a broader reading. The First-tier Tribunal had made no reasoned finding on the relevance of food-labelling rules, and that separate question was not resolved by this appeal.

1. Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber): Dismissed Animal Equality’s appeal and refused the Secretary of State permission to cross-appeal.
2. First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber (Information Rights)): Dismissed the appeals against the Secretary of State’s decision; case FD/2024/0002, decision dated 21 January 2025.