Keith Kennaugh v Information Commissioner & Anor

Before the Practice Direction took effect on 24 October 2025, the The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009 did not require parties to use standard forms, though the Tribunal could direct their use as a matter of case management. Rule 22(2)(a) requires an appellant’s ordinary residential address, distinct from an address for service. Failure to provide it does not automatically invalidate an appeal: the Tribunal may use its rule 7(2) powers, consistently with the overriding objective, including waiving the requirement. The Upper Tribunal left open whether the Rules require a UK address.

Keith Kennaugh appealed three decisions of the First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber). Two appeals concerned directions requiring him to use standard forms in future proceedings, although his existing proceedings had been allowed to continue without them. Those proceedings included an application under section 166 of the Data Protection Act 2018 and an appeal under section 57 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000. The third appeal concerned a direction requiring him to provide his ordinary residential address in a separate Freedom of Information Act appeal, with strike-out threatened for non-compliance.

The central questions were whether the GRC Rules required use of standard forms before the Practice Direction took effect, and whether an appellant had to provide a residential address under rule 22(2)(a).

1. All three appeals were dismissed. The First-tier Tribunal’s decisions involved no material error of law.

2. Before the Practice Direction took effect, the GRC Rules did not require a party to use a prescribed form to start proceedings or make an application. Rule 22 required a notice of appeal containing specified information, and rule 1(3) defined a notice of appeal as a document starting proceedings. Neither provision prescribed a particular form. The later Practice Direction governed form use from 24 October 2025.

3. The absence of a rule requiring standard forms did not prevent the Tribunal from directing their use in a particular case. The Registrar and District Judge could reasonably consider that forms helped parties meet rule 22 requirements and assisted administrative staff. As Mr Kennaugh gave no good reason beyond personal preference for refusing them, the direction was an available case-management decision. The Upper Tribunal would not have interfered with it even without the later Practice Direction.

4. Rule 22(2)(a) requires an appellant’s ordinary residential address. That is distinct from the address for service under rule 22(2)(c), which may be another address. The Upper Tribunal adopted the analysis in William Thackeray v IC and BBC (EA/2011/0045 and EA/2011/0035). An email address or service address alone does not satisfy rule 22(2)(a).

5. Non-compliance does not automatically invalidate a notice of appeal. Under rule 7(2), the Tribunal may waive the requirement, require the failure to be remedied, strike out the case under rule 8, or restrict participation. It must exercise those powers consistently with the overriding objective in rule 2. In a case involving a homeless or nomadic person, the Tribunal could waive the residential-address requirement, perhaps while requiring an address for correspondence. On the facts, the judge was entitled to direct Mr Kennaugh to provide his address, with strike-out in default.

6. The Upper Tribunal did not decide whether rule 22(2)(a) requires a UK address. Given that appeal rights under the Data Protection Act 2018 and the Freedom of Information Act 2000 are not limited to UK residents, the judge was inclined to accept that the Rules themselves do not impose that requirement.

7. The requests for costs or damages concerning the First-tier Tribunal’s handling of the underlying cases could not be pursued by appeal. The First-tier Tribunal was not a party to those proceedings and could not make an order against itself. The separate costs application against the First-tier Tribunal as a party in the Upper Tribunal was refused: rule 10(3)(d) of the Upper Tribunal Rules concerns unreasonable conduct of Upper Tribunal proceedings, and the First-tier Tribunal had not acted unreasonably.

• Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber): Permission to appeal was granted in all three appeals. The appeals were joined and dismissed; the First-tier Tribunal decisions were held to involve no error of law.
• First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber): The decisions under appeal were dated 27 January 2025 in cases FT/EA/2024/0349 and FT/EA/2025/0008, and 29 September 2025 in case FT/EA/2025/0330. The first two proceedings were later permitted to continue without standard forms, while the third was subject to a direction to provide a residential address in default of which it would be struck out.