T v Secretary of State for the Home Department (T v Immigration Officer)

A crime is political under article 1F(b) of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees only if it serves a political purpose and has a sufficiently close and direct link to that purpose. The means and target are material. Indiscriminate violence against civilians may sever the necessary link even where the offender genuinely seeks to overthrow or change a government.

Criminal acts directed against a state and intended or calculated to create terror among particular persons or the public constitute terrorism capable of falling outside the political-crime exception. A person reasonably suspected of committing such a serious non-political crime is excluded from Convention protection.

The appellant was an Algerian national and member of the Front Islamique du Salut. He entered the United Kingdom using false documents and claimed asylum. The immigration authorities found that he had knowingly participated in planning an airport bombing which killed ten people and an attack on an army barracks in which one person died.

The Secretary of State accepted that the appellant otherwise had a well-founded fear of persecution if returned to Algeria. A special adjudicator and the Immigration Appeal Tribunal nevertheless held that article 1F(b) of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees excluded him from protection because there were serious reasons for considering that he had committed serious non-political crimes.

The Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal, reasoning that the airport bombing was grossly disproportionate to, and insufficiently connected with, its asserted political objective. The question for the House was how a political crime should be identified for the purposes of article 1F(b).

1. Appeal dismissed unanimously. Lord Lloyd of Berwick delivered the leading speech. Lord Keith of Kinkel and Lord Browne-Wilkinson expressly agreed with it. Lord Mustill and Lord Slynn of Hadley reached the same disposition, although their formulations differed in some respects.

2. Per Lord Lloyd, a crime is political for article 1F(b) only where: (i) it is committed for the purpose of overthrowing, subverting or changing a government, or inducing it to change its policy; and (ii) there is a sufficiently close and direct link between the crime and that purpose. In assessing the second condition, regard must be had to the means employed, whether the target was governmental or military rather than civilian, and whether indiscriminate death or injury to the public was likely.

3. The appellant satisfied the subjective condition because he sought to overthrow the Algerian government. He failed the objective condition. Although an airport might be regarded as a governmental target, the bombing was almost bound to kill members of the public and employed indiscriminate means. The political link was therefore too remote. The Tribunal was entitled to find serious reasons for considering that the appellant had committed a serious non-political crime. Lord Lloyd found it unnecessary to decide whether the barracks attack independently fell within article 1F(b).

4. Lord Mustill preferred an objective terrorism criterion to free-standing tests of causation, remoteness, proportionality or atrociousness. He adopted as serviceable the conception of terrorism as criminal acts directed against a state and intended or calculated to create terror among particular persons, a group or the public. On that approach, both the airport bombing and the barracks attack fell within article 1F(b).

5. Lord Slynn held that serious non-political crime includes violence intended or likely to create terror and to injure persons unconnected with the government. His formulation was not intended to be exhaustive. The indiscriminate airport bombing was outside Convention protection, and the Tribunal was also entitled to treat the barracks incident as a random killing.

6. The decision did not oblige the Secretary of State to return the appellant to Algeria if another state would accept him. It established that the appellant could not insist on remaining in the United Kingdom under the Convention.

1. House of Lords: The Court of Appeal's order of 3 November 1994 was affirmed and the appeal dismissed unanimously.

2. Court of Appeal: Nourse, Glidewell and Simon Brown LJJ dismissed the appeal. The court criticised the Tribunal's reasoning but held that the airport bombing was insufficiently connected with, and grossly disproportionate to, the asserted political objective.

3. Immigration Appeal Tribunal: The Tribunal dismissed the appeal. It found that the appellant was personally and knowingly involved in terrorist activity, including an indiscriminate bombing which killed innocent people.

4. Special adjudicator: The adjudicator dismissed the appeal, finding serious reasons for considering that the appellant had committed serious non-political crimes within article 1F(b) of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.