(1)
This section applies if the compromise or arrangement is not agreed by a number representing at least 75% in value of a class of creditors or (as the case may be) of members of the company (“the dissenting class”), present and voting either in person or by proxy at the meeting summoned under section 901C.
(2)If conditions A and B are met, the fact that the dissenting class has not agreed the compromise or arrangement does not prevent the court from sanctioning it under section 901F.
(3)Condition A is that the court is satisfied that, if the compromise or arrangement were to be sanctioned under section 901F, none of the members of the dissenting class would be any worse off than they would be in the event of the relevant alternative (see subsection (4)).
(4)
For the purposes of this section “the relevant alternative” is whatever the court considers would be most likely to occur in relation to the company if the compromise or arrangement were not sanctioned under section 901F.
(5)Condition B is that the compromise or arrangement has been agreed by a number representing 75% in value of a class of creditors or (as the case may be) of members, present and voting either in person or by proxy at the meeting summoned under section 901C, who would receive a payment, or have a genuine economic interest in the company, in the event of the relevant alternative.
(6)The Secretary of State may by regulations amend this section for the purpose of—
(a)adding to the conditions that must be met for the purposes of this section;
(b)removing or varying any of those conditions.
(7)Regulations under subsection (6) are subject to affirmative resolution procedure.
Cases considering section 901G (65)
[2025] EWCA Civ 821 · 1 July 2025Interprets
The Court interpreted and applied the cross-class cram-down jurisdiction. Satisfaction of its statutory conditions is necessary but does not remove the court’s obligation to assess fairness when exercising its sanction discretion (see paras [70]-[102]; [106]-[191]).
The subsection identifies a dissenting class as one failing to approve a plan by at least 75% in value of those present and voting (see para [7]).
Where Conditions A and B are met, the dissent of a class does not prevent sanction under section 901F (see para [7]).
The no worse off condition compares the financial value of existing rights in the relevant alternative with the rights offered under the plan. It includes third-party rights released by the plan, but excludes wider commercial advantages unconnected with affected rights (see paras [79]; [91]-[102]).
The relevant alternative is the event which the court considers most likely if the plan is not sanctioned. The accepted alternative in this case was insolvent liquidation (see paras [7]; [44]).
Condition B requires approval by the prescribed majority of a class which would receive a payment or have a genuine economic interest in the relevant alternative (see para [7]).
[2025] EWCA Civ 475 · 15 April 2025Interprets
The cross-class cram-down power permits sanction despite a dissenting class where the statutory conditions are met. Satisfaction of those conditions does not exhaust the court’s discretion, which also requires scrutiny of fairness and allocation. (see paras [34]; [102]–[113])
The no-worse-off condition is necessary before a dissenting class may be crammed down, but it is not sufficient by itself to justify sanction. (see para [104])
[2024] EWCA Civ 24 · 23 January 2024Interprets
Cross-class cram down removes a class veto but requires a separate discretionary assessment of fair allocation and justified differential treatment. The sanction discretion was exercised on incorrect principles and the sanction order was set aside. (see paras [153]–[160]; [233]; [280])
A dissenting class has not provided the enhanced 75% approval required for ordinary sanction. A rationality test based on a lesser majority cannot replace the distinct cross-class assessment. (see para [130])
The permissive wording preserves the sanction discretion after Conditions A and B are satisfied. Their satisfaction creates no presumption favouring sanction. (see paras [153]–[154])
Condition A requires every dissenting class member to be no worse off than in the relevant alternative. It supplies a jurisdictional floor, rather than an answer to fair distribution of restructuring benefits. (see paras [12]; [153]; [160])
The relevant alternative is the most likely outcome absent sanction. Here it was formal insolvency with equal unsecured ranking, providing the reference point for comparison rather than bond-market pricing while the group remained a going concern. (see paras [42]; [162]; [236]–[238])
Condition B requires statutory approval from a class receiving payment or having a genuine economic interest in the relevant alternative. Representation and proper voting motives deserve particular scrutiny for the class relied upon to satisfy it. (see paras [12]; [120])
Cited only.
- TG Jones High Street Limited, Re[2026] EWHC 2079 (Ch) · 5 August 2026
- NFE Global Holdings Limited & Anor, Re[2026] EWHC 1620 (Ch) · 18 June 2026
- Poundstretcher Limited, Re[2026] EWHC 1438 (Ch) · 12 June 2026
- Waldorf Production UK plc, Re[2026] EWHC 1316 (Ch) · 22 May 2026
- Waldorf Production UK Plc, Re[2026] EWHC 1014 (Ch) · 5 May 2026
- Argo Blockchain plc, Re[2025] EWHC 3395 (Ch) · 23 December 2025
- Poundland Limited, Re[2025] EWHC 2755 (Ch) · 24 October 2025
- River Island Holdings Limited, Re[2025] EWHC 2276 (Ch) · 4 September 2025
- Waldorf Production UK Plc, Re[2025] EWHC 2181 (Ch) · 19 August 2025
- Madagascar Oil Limited, Re[2025] EWHC 2129 (Ch) · 15 August 2025
- Poundland Limited, Re[2025] EWHC 1822 (Ch) · 8 July 2025
- Petrofac Limited & Anor, Re[2025] EWHC 1250 (Ch) · 20 May 2025
- OutsideClinic Limited, Re The Companies Act 2006[2025] EWHC 875 (Ch) · 11 April 2025
- Enzen Global Limited & Anor, Re[2025] EWHC 852 (Ch) · 9 April 2025
- Thames Water Utilities Holdings Ltd, Re[2025] EWHC 338 (Ch) · 18 February 2025
- Ambatovy Minerals Societe Anonyme & Anor, Re[2025] EWHC 279 (Ch) · 11 February 2025
- Sino-Ocean Group Holding Limited, Re[2025] EWHC 205 (Ch) · 3 February 2025
45 more judgments, and what each says about section 901G, are in the
case-law panel in the full Act.