(1)Where by an agreement made in relation to future copyright, and signed by or on behalf of the prospective owner of the copyright, the prospective owner purports to assign the future copyright (wholly or partially) to another person, then if, on the copyright coming into existence, the assignee or another person claiming under him would be entitled as against all other persons to require the copyright to be vested in him, the copyright shall vest in the assignee or his successor in title by virtue of this subsection.
(2)In this Part—
“future copyright” means copyright which will or may come into existence in respect of a future work or class of works or on the occurrence of a future event; and
“prospective owner” shall be construed accordingly, and includes a person who is prospectively entitled to copyright by virtue of such an agreement as is mentioned in subsection (1).
(3)A licence granted by a prospective owner of copyright is binding on every successor in title to his interest (or prospective interest) in the right, except a purchaser in good faith for valuable consideration and without notice (actual or constructive) of the licence or a person deriving title from such a purchaser; and references in this Part to doing anything with, or without, the licence of the copyright owner shall be construed accordingly.
Cases considering section 91 8
[2021] EWCA Civ 1770 · 2 December 2021
The court applied the future-copyright vesting mechanism to copyrights first owned by the appellant during continuing development work. The promised bonus supplied consideration, so future copyrights vested in the respondent by operation of law. (see para [43])
[2013] EWCA Civ 1236 · 16 October 2013Defines
Section 91 was treated as the statutory mechanism that vests legal and equitable title in the first assignee of future copyright. Its priority condition reflects the equitable rule that the first attached equity prevails. (see paras [11]-[13], [37]-[41])
Section 91(1) makes a signed agreement relating to future copyright effective to vest the copyright in the assignee when it comes into existence, if the assignee is entitled against all other persons. The Court held that the earlier assignment therefore took priority and vested the copyright in the PRS. (see paras [8], [24]-[29], [46])
Section 91(2) defines future copyright and prospective owner. The Court treated the composers as prospective owners for a future song, and held that the assignment’s scope did not depend on their actually becoming copyright owners when the song was created. (see paras [8], [14]-[15], [23])
[2025] EWHC 725 (Ch) · 7 March 2025
The court notes that the Act permits assignment of copyright in future-created works, but finds that the pleaded agreement did not contain such an assignment. (see paras [22], [48]-[51])
What each judgment says about section 91 is in the case-law panel in the full Act.