SCHEDULE B1 ADMINISTRATION
77 (1) An order of the court under paragraph 76—
(a) may be made in respect of an administrator whose term of office has already been extended by order or by consent, but
(b) may not be made after the expiry of the administrator’s term of office.
(2) Where an order is made under paragraph 76 the administrator shall as soon as is reasonably practicable notify the registrar of companies.
(3) An administrator who fails without reasonable excuse to comply with sub-paragraph (2) commits an offence.
1 (1) For the purposes of this Act “administrator” of a company means a person appointed under this Schedule to manage the company’s affairs, business and property.
Defined in Sch.B1 para.1(1) · see it in the full Act“administrator” has the meaning given by paragraph 1 and, where the context requires, includes a reference to a former administrator,
Defined in Sch.B1 para.111(1) · see it in the full Act(3) But where the administrator has made a statement under paragraph 52(1)(b) “consent” means—
(a) consent of each secured creditor of the company, or
(b) if the administrator thinks that a distribution may be made to preferential creditors, consent of—
(i) each secured creditor of the company, and
(ii) the preferential creditors of the company.
Defined in Sch.B1 para.108(3) · see it in the full Act2 Section 233B does not apply in relation to a contract for the supply of goods or services to a company (“the company”) where any of paragraphs 3 to 11 applies.
Defined in Sch.4ZZA para.2 · see it in the full Act(1A) In this Schedule, “company” means—
(a)a company registered under the Companies Act 2006 in England and Wales or Scotland,
(b)a company incorporated in an EEA State ..., or
(c)a company not incorporated in an EEA State but having its centre of main interests in a member State (other than Denmark) or in the United Kingdom .
Defined in Sch.B1 para.111(1A) · see it in the full ActThe provision was interpreted as a jurisdictional limit. An order extending an administrator’s term cannot be made after the term has expired, and retrospective effect cannot alter the date on which the order is made. (see paras [21]-[30])
The court accepted that successive retrospective orders could not be used to circumvent the prohibition on extending the administration period. (see para [22])
The court treated the prohibition on making an extension order after expiry as mandatory. It therefore lacked jurisdiction to validate the expired administration by a later extension order. (see paras [13]; [25]; [29])
What each judgment says about Schedule B1, paragraph 77 is in the case-law panel in the full Act.