Insolvency Act 1986, section 309

Time-limit for notice under s. 307 or 308

Part IX Bankruptcy

(1)Except with the leave of the court, a notice shall not be served—

(a)under section 307, after the end of the period of 42 days beginning with the day on which it first came to the knowledge of the trustee that property in question had been acquired by, or had devolved upon, the bankrupt;

(b)under section 308 [F809or section 308AF809] , after the end of the period of 42 days beginning with the day on which the property [F810or tenancyF810] in question first came to the knowledge of the trustee.

(2)For the purposes of this section—

(a)any thing which comes to the knowledge of the trustee is deemed in relation to any successor of his as trustee to have come to the knowledge of the sucessor at the same time; and

(b)any thing which comes (otherwise than under paragraph (a)) to the knowledge of a person before he is the trustee is deemed to come to his knowledge on his appointment taking effect or, in the case of the official receiver, on his becoming trustee.

Cases considering section 309 6

Amy Mehers (Trustee in Bankruptcy of Scherzade Khilji) v Scherzade Khilji & Anor

[2023] EWHC 298 (Ch) · 17 February 2023Interprets

Sets the time limit for serving an after-acquired property notice by reference to when the relevant acquisition first came to the trustee’s knowledge. The court compared its wording with section 283A(5) and held that the statutory regimes differ materially (see paras [39], [46]). Uses the date on which the relevant after-acquired property first came to the trustee’s knowledge as the starting point for the notice period. The court contrasted that wording with section 283A(5) (see paras [39], [46]).

Viscount St Davids v Lewis (Trustee in Bankruptcy)

[2015] EWHC 2826 (Ch) · 9 October 2015Interprets

Interprets the statutory time-limit framework as requiring actual knowledge before the 42-day period begins to run. (see paras [3]; [27]-[35]) Interprets “knowledge” as actual knowledge that the property was acquired by the bankrupt and that acquisition occurred after commencement of the bankruptcy. In cases of non-disclosure, cogent evidence verified to the trustee’s reasonable satisfaction was normally required. (see paras [29]-[35]; [68]) Confirms that knowledge may be attributed to a trustee’s successors in office. The judgment records this as part of the applicable principles. (see para [31])

Scherzade Khilji v Amy Mehers (Trustee in Backruptcy) & Anor

[2025] EWHC 548 (Ch) · 11 March 2025Limits

Confirms that the comparison with s309 concerns another provision dealing with a bankrupt’s post-bankruptcy property, while recognising that both provisions address the trustee’s state of knowledge (see paras [22], [42]).

1 more judgment, and what each says about section 309, are in the case-law panel in the full Act.

Amendments and notes

3 notes from legislation.gov.uk

Amendments

  1. F809Words inserted by Housing Act 1988 (c. 50, SIF 75:1), s. 117(3)(a)
  2. F810Words inserted by Housing Act 1988 (c. 50, SIF 75:1), s. 117(3)(b)

Modifications

  1. C1026S. 309 applied with modifications by S.I. 1986/1999, art. 3, Sch. 1 Pt. II