(1)This section and the next apply where the trustee has disclaimed property under section 315.
(2)An application may be made to the court under this section by—
(a)any person who claims an interest in the disclaimed property,
(b)any person who is under any liability in respect of the disclaimed property, not being a liability discharged by the disclaimer, or
(c)where the disclaimed property is property in a dwelling house, any person who at the time when the bankruptcy application was made or (as the case may be) the bankruptcy petition was presented was in occupation of or entitled to occupy the dwelling house.
(3)Subject as follows in this section and the next, the court may, on an application under this section, make an order on such terms as it thinks fit for the vesting of the disclaimed property in, or for its delivery to—
(a)a person entitled to it or a trustee for such a person,
(b)a person subject to such a liability as is mentioned in subsection (2)(b) or a trustee for such a person, or
(c)where the disclaimed property is property in a dwelling house, any person who at the time when the bankruptcy application was made or (as the case may be) the bankruptcy petition was presented was in occupation of or entitled to occupy the dwelling house.
(4)The court shall not make an order by virtue of subsection (3)(b) except where it appears to the court that it would be just to do so for the purpose of compensating the person subject to the liability in respect of the disclaimer.
(5)The effect of any order under this section shall be taken into account in assessing for the purposes of section 315(5) the extent of any loss or damage sustained by any person in consequence of the disclaimer.
(6)An order under this section vesting property in any person need not be completed by any conveyance, assignment or transfer.
Cases considering section 320 9
[2001] EWCA Civ 223 · 8 February 2001Defines
The court held that the vesting power applies where the trustee in bankruptcy has disclaimed property. Without evidence of disclaimer, the claimant was not entitled to a vesting order.
The court relied on subsection (1) to identify disclaimer by the trustee as the condition for exercising the vesting discretion.
[2018] EWHC 3489 (Ch) · 19 December 2018Interprets
The court applied section 320(1) as identifying the statutory context: the vesting-order provisions apply where the trustee has disclaimed property under section 315. (see para [19])
The court held that section 320(2)(a) requires an existing proprietary interest, or at least a genuine claim to one, and does not allow a trustee to create standing simply by seeking a vesting order. The applicant therefore lacked standing. (see paras [20]-[25])
The separate category for a person under a liability in respect of disclaimed property supported reading section 320(2)(a) as referring to a proprietary interest rather than a general interest in the outcome. (see paras [20]-[24])
The separate dwelling-house category was used as part of the statutory-context reasoning confirming that section 320(2)(a) should not be given a broad meaning extending to anyone interested in the asset. (see para [21])
The court treated the vesting power as concerning the vesting or delivery of the disclaimed property itself in a person within the statutory applicant categories. It could not be used by this applicant to obtain the later sale surpluses. (see paras [26]-[32])
The provision was considered as identifying the person entitled to the disclaimed property, or a trustee for that person, as a possible vesting recipient. The trustee’s application did not satisfy that requirement. (see paras [19]-[21])
The provision was identified as permitting vesting in a person subject to a relevant liability, but it did not assist an applicant who had no such liability and no standing under section 320(2). (see paras [19]-[25])
The dwelling-house vesting category formed part of the statutory structure showing that the court’s power was limited to the persons and property identified by section 320. (see para [21])
The provision was identified as requiring the effect of a vesting order to be taken into account when assessing loss or damage resulting from disclaimer. (see para [19])
The provision was identified as removing any need for a vesting order to be completed by conveyance, assignment or transfer. (see para [19])
[2015] EWHC 3072 (Ch) · 27 October 2015Limits
Interpreted as providing a vesting-order jurisdiction directed principally to protecting occupation of a dwelling house or its normal residential value. The provision did not support an order conferring a merely obstructive or nuisance value (see paras [67], [70], [82]).
Applied to identify persons with standing to seek a vesting order. The appellant qualified under paragraph (c), not paragraphs (a) or (b) (see paras [62]-[64]).
Applied to reject standing based on the appellant’s former ownership, because that interest had vested in the trustee and was determined by disclaimer (see paras [62], [69]).
Applied because the appellant had occupied the dwelling house when the bankruptcy petition was presented. Standing derived from occupation, but did not require the court to vest the whole pier (see paras [63]-[70]).
Interpreted as conferring a broad discretion to vest all or part of the disclaimed property, subject to the statutory purpose and the consequences for the applicant and the public interest. The discretion was exercised against any vesting order on the facts (see paras [64], [72]-[87]).
Considered as part of the statutory protection for a person entitled to occupy a dwelling house. It did not justify vesting property solely to create nuisance value (see paras [3], [82]).
Cited as one of the limits on the vesting-order discretion in leasehold cases. Cited only.
What each judgment says about section 320 is in the case-law panel in the full Act.