(1)This section applies to any proceedings to enforce any claim or lien against a ship or her owners—
(a)in respect of damage or loss caused by the fault of that ship to another ship, its cargo or freight or any property on board it; or
(b)for damages for loss of life or personal injury caused by the fault of that ship to any person on board another ship.
(2)The extent of the fault is immaterial for the purposes of this section.
(3)Subject to subsections (5) and (6) below, no proceedings to which this section applies shall be brought after the period of two years from the date when—
(a)the damage or loss was caused; or
(b)the loss of life or injury was suffered.
(4)Subject to subsections (5) and (6) below, no proceedings under any of sections 187 to 189 to enforce any contribution in respect of any overpaid proportion of any damages for loss of life or personal injury shall be brought after the period of one year from the date of payment.
(5)Any court having jurisdiction in such proceedings may, in accordance with rules of court, extend the period allowed for bringing proceedings to such extent and on such conditions as it thinks fit.
(6)Any such court, if satisfied that there has not been during any period allowed for bringing proceedings any reasonable opportunity of arresting the defendant ship within—
(a)the jurisdiction of the court, or
(b)the territorial sea of the country to which the plaintiff’s ship belongs or in which the plaintiff resides or has his principal place of business,
shall extend the period allowed for bringing proceedings to an extent sufficient to give a reasonable opportunity of so arresting the ship.
(7)This section has effect subject to section 43 of the Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Act 2023.
Cases considering section 190 8
[2015] EWCA Civ 1035 · 15 October 2015Limits
Section 190(3) bars the remedy after two years while leaving the underlying claim in existence. The relevant proceedings are those commenced by the particular claim form under consideration. (see paras [51], [57])
Section 190(5) confers a discretionary power to extend time. The power is exercised through the two-stage good-reason framework, and culpable mistake in failing to commence proceedings in time is insufficient. (see paras [37]-[39], [71]-[92])
Section 190(6) provides a mandatory extension where there has been no reasonable opportunity to arrest the defendant ship. It applies to in rem proceedings and cannot justify extending time for an in personam claim. (see paras [47]-[49])
The reference to arrest within the jurisdiction forms part of the mandatory in rem extension mechanism. It does not provide an excuse for delay in serving proceedings on a person. (see paras [48]-[49])
The alternative territorial-sea limb reflects the statutory extension concerned with the opportunity to arrest the vessel. It remains confined to in rem proceedings. (see para [56])
[2015] EWHC 3445 (Admlty) · 27 November 2015Limits
Applies the two-year period for bringing collision proceedings, subject to statutory or agreed extension. The claimants issued within the agreed period, so the issue was service rather than limitation. (see paras [6], [37])
Requires a good reason before the court considers exercising discretion to extend time. The claimants’ failure to issue and serve proceedings earlier, despite having the means to do so, supplied no good reason. (see paras [61]-[63], [70]-[73])
Applies where the claimant lacked a reasonable opportunity to arrest the defendant ship in a case where arrest is relevant to founding jurisdiction. It does not apply where a jurisdiction agreement, security and promises not to arrest made arrest irrelevant. (see paras [64]-[69])
[2015] EWHC 720 (Admlty) · 14 April 2015Interprets
Defines the proceedings to which the statutory limitation regime applies, including claims or liens concerning damage caused by one ship to another. It frames the collision claim considered by the court (see para [8]).
Applies the two-year limitation period for proceedings enforcing a claim or lien for collision damage. The claimant’s failure to commence proceedings within that period was fatal absent a justified extension (see paras [8], [32]-[38]).
Confirms the court’s power to extend the limitation period on such terms as it thinks fit, but requires that discretion to be exercised in a principled manner. A good reason is required before the court considers exercising the discretion (see paras [8], [21], [25]-[30]).
What each judgment says about section 190 is in the case-law panel in the full Act.