Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co Ltd v Veitch

[1942] AC 435

Case details

Case citations
[1942] AC 435 · [1941] UKHL 2 · [1942] 1 All ER 142
Court
House of Lords
Judgment date
15 December 1941
Judgment text

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Subjects
Tort Economic torts Conspiracy to injure
Keywords
civil conspiracy conspiracy to injure predominant purpose lawful means trade union embargo collective bargaining legitimate self-interest mixed purposes interdict economic loss
Outcome
appeal dismissed unanimously (5–0)
Judicial consideration

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Summary

A combination constitutes actionable civil conspiracy only where the agreement is carried into effect, damage results, and the object or means are unlawful. Where lawful means are used, the decisive question is the combination’s real and predominant purpose, rather than the harm foreseen or produced.

No action lies where the predominant purpose is lawfully to protect or promote interests which the combiners honestly believe are directly at risk. This remains so even if another person’s business suffers severe or inevitable damage. Conversely, a predominant purpose of wrongful harm is actionable.

Mixed purposes must be assessed by identifying the predominant object. The combiners need not derive identical benefits if they share a sufficient lawful object. Malevolence is unnecessary, and disproportionate harm is relevant only as evidence when deciding whether the asserted lawful purpose is genuine.

Factual background

The appellants were producers of Harris Tweed in Lewis who used yarn imported from the mainland. The respondents were officials of the Transport and General Workers’ Union. Acting on their instructions, unionised dockers at Stornoway refused to handle yarn consigned to the appellants and certain tweed sent by them to the mainland. The embargo caused substantial interference with the appellants’ businesses, but involved no breach of contract or other independently unlawful means.

The Lord Ordinary dismissed the petition for interdict after proof. The Second Division affirmed that decision by a majority, Lord Mackay dissenting. Seven of the original petitioners appealed to the House of Lords.

The central issue was whether the respondents’ combination was an actionable conspiracy to injure. In particular, the House had to determine whether the embargo’s predominant purpose was to damage the appellants or lawfully to promote the interests of the union and its members.

Held

  1. Disposition. The House of Lords unanimously dismissed the appeal. The Lord Chancellor moved that it be dismissed with costs, and Viscount Maugham, Lord Thankerton, Lord Wright and Lord Porter agreed in the result.
  2. Constitution of the tort. Per the Lord Chancellor, Lord Wright and Lord Porter, a criminal conspiracy is complete upon agreement, but a civil conspiracy requires implementation of the combination and resulting damage. Where the acts employed are otherwise lawful, liability depends upon proving a combination whose unlawful and predominant purpose is to injure the claimant.
  3. Predominant purpose. The Lord Chancellor delivered the leading speech. The relevant inquiry was the real object for which the combiners acted, rather than whether they foresaw or should have foreseen that damage would result. Where several purposes existed, the predominant purpose governed. A combination predominantly directed towards the lawful protection or promotion of interests which the combiners honestly believed would otherwise suffer directly was not tortious if no unlawful means were employed. Viscount Maugham, Lord Wright and Lord Porter adopted substantially the same approach. This explained and applied the principles discussed in Mogul Steamship Co v McGregor, Gow & Co [1892] AC 25 and Sorrell v Smith [1925] AC 700.
  4. Malevolence and consequences. Per the Lord Chancellor, Viscount Maugham and Lord Wright, personal spite or malevolence was not an essential element of liability. Its absence did not itself determine the case. The court had to identify the practical object of the combination. Foreseen, intended or inevitable damage did not establish the tort where that damage was a means of pursuing a predominant lawful object.
  5. Application. The predominant object of the embargo was to promote the interests of union members by preventing price-cutting and unregulated competition, supporting the island industry, improving the basis for collective bargaining and protecting wage prospects. Those were legitimate interests. The embargo used no independently unlawful means, and the appellants therefore failed to prove an actionable conspiracy.
  6. Different participants and interests. Viscount Maugham, Lord Wright and Lord Porter reasoned that complete identity between the interests of all combiners was unnecessary. Employers and a trade union could pursue a sufficient common object while seeking different benefits from it. The result was unchanged even on the assumption that millowners participated in the combination.
  7. Severity and policy. Per the Lord Chancellor, supported by Lord Wright and Lord Porter, the court could not assess the expediency of the union’s policy or impose liability merely because the resulting damage was severe or disproportionate. Severity could cast doubt upon the genuineness of the asserted purpose, but became legally irrelevant once a legitimate predominant purpose and lawful means were established.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

  1. House of Lords: In Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co Ltd v Veitch [1942] AC 435, the House unanimously dismissed the appeal and affirmed the refusal of interdict.
  2. Second Division of the Court of Session: On 22 December 1939, the court adhered to the Lord Ordinary’s interlocutor and refused the reclaiming motion. Lord Mackay dissented.
  3. Lord Ordinary: On 8 March 1939, Lord Jamieson dismissed the petition and complaint on the merits and recalled the interim interdict granted on 24 February 1938.

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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