Paris v Stepney Borough Council

An employer’s duty to take reasonable care is owed to each employee individually. The precautions required depend both on the likelihood of an accident and on the foreseeable gravity of its consequences.

A known disability may therefore require additional protection even though it does not increase the probability of an accident. Where injury would have exceptionally serious consequences for a particular employee, reasonable care may demand a simple and inexpensive precaution which would not be required for employees without that vulnerability.

The appellant, who was effectively blind in his left eye, worked in the respondents’ garage. The respondents knew of his disability. While he was striking a rusty bolt with a steel hammer, a metal fragment entered his right eye and rendered him almost completely blind. The respondents had neither provided goggles nor required their use.

Lynskey J held that the respondents owed the appellant an individual duty to provide and require goggles. The Court of Appeal reversed that judgment because the disability increased the consequences of an accident but not its likelihood.

The central issue was whether the foreseeable gravity of injury to a particularly vulnerable employee was relevant when determining the precautions required of a reasonable employer.

1. By a majority, the appeal was allowed. The Court of Appeal’s order was reversed and Lynskey J’s judgment on liability was restored. The question of damages remained for the Court of Appeal. Lord Normand, Lord Oaksey and Lord MacDermott formed the majority. Lord Simonds and Lord Morton of Henryton dissented.

2. Per Lord Normand, the reasonable and prudent employer considers both the probability of an accident and the gravity of its foreseeable consequences. Restricting the inquiry to the likelihood of an accident would artificially narrow the ordinary standard of reasonable care. Lord Oaksey agreed entirely. Lord MacDermott likewise held that an employer’s duty concerns the consequences of workplace risks as well as their causes.

3. Per Lord Normand, the duty is owed to the employee as an individual. A known disability which makes the consequences of an accident more serious is therefore relevant even where it does not increase the chance of the accident occurring. Lord Oaksey and Lord MacDermott adopted the same individualised approach.

4. Per Lord Normand, the evidence did not establish a usual practice of providing goggles for this work. Nevertheless, the trial judge was entitled to find the precaution obviously necessary for this particular employee. The work exposed his remaining useful eye to flying metal, and complete blindness was a calamity distinct in gravity from the loss of one of two sound eyes. Lord Oaksey emphasised that goggles were a simple and inexpensive precaution. Lord MacDermott considered that the known danger, the appellant’s appreciably greater risk of blindness and the availability of reasonable protection provided ample evidence of negligence.

5. Lord Simonds and Lord Morton agreed that the gravity of foreseeable injury was relevant in principle. They dissented because the danger was too remote to require goggles and considered that the evidence did not justify imposing a special obligation for a one-eyed employee when no such obligation arose for other employees.

1. House of Lords: By a majority, allowed the appeal, reversed the Court of Appeal’s order and restored Lynskey J’s judgment on liability. The assessment of damages remained for the Court of Appeal.

2. Court of Appeal: Reversed Lynskey J and entered judgment for the respondents, holding that the appellant’s disability affected the extent of the damage but not the scope of the employer’s duty.

3. High Court: Lynskey J entered judgment for the appellant for £5,250, holding that the respondents were required to provide and require the use of goggles for this particular employee.