Case details
Summary
In a work-related psychiatric injury claim, foreseeability must be tied to the particular injury, causal mechanism and timing, rather than expressed at the broad level of any harm to mental health. A warning of a future risk from continuing overload does not necessarily make an employer responsible for an immediate collapse caused by disappointment that a workload measure was not implemented. Foreseeability informs both the duty and the reasonableness and timing of precautionary action. A workplace promise or reasonable expectation may be relevant, but it does not set the tortious standard. Liability also requires breach in relation to the injury that occurred. On the findings, it was reasonable to wait and assess the employee after her holiday, so breach was not established.
Factual background
The appellant was employed by the respondent as a care manager. She claimed that excessive workload and stress caused a depressive illness. At a meeting shortly before a three-week holiday, she expressed concern about the effect of work pressures on her future health. Her manager agreed to consider introducing a system of stacking cases, but it was not implemented before the appellant returned to work. She suffered a breakdown shortly afterwards.
Buckley J dismissed the negligence claim. He found that the respondent knew of general workload pressures but had no reason to foresee an immediate psychiatric collapse. The appeal concerned whether the foreseeable future risk of illness from continuing overload also encompassed the immediate injury that occurred, and whether failure to implement stacking before the appellant’s return constituted negligence.
Held
The appeal was dismissed. Mance LJ gave the principal judgment, with Buxton LJ agreeing. Ward LJ agreed with the result but approached the issue differently.
- The relevant foreseeable risk was not a general risk of psychiatric illness. The findings established only a future risk of illness if excessive workload continued. The immediate collapse following disappointment that stacking had not been implemented was a different injury arising through a different mechanism and at a different time.
- Under Hatton v Sutherland [2002] EWCA Civ 76, foreseeability and breach remain distinct questions. A workplace promise or an employee’s reasonable expectation does not itself establish the standard of reasonable care. The question was whether a reasonable employer should have implemented stacking before the appellant returned, having regard to the foreseeable risk and the circumstances.
- The failure to prevent one type of injury cannot establish liability for another type of injury. The reasoning in Jolley v Sutton LBC [2000] 1 WLR 1082 did not assist the appellant because that case concerned risks arising from the same source, whereas the present injury resulted from an unforeseeable reaction to a particular disappointment.
- Buxton LJ emphasised that there is no negligence in the abstract. Liability depends on failure to take precautions against a foreseen or foreseeable, legally relevant danger. The distinction between physical and psychiatric injury does not remove that requirement.
- Ward LJ considered that a future risk of psychiatric harm was foreseeable and that failure to implement stacking might have caused the breakdown without being too remote. Nevertheless, applying the reasonableness factors identified in Hatton, the risk of immediate breakdown was small and it was reasonable for the manager to wait and assess the appellant’s condition after the holiday. Breach was therefore not established. Any observations on causation and remoteness were conditional.
Appeal dismissed with costs. The costs were referred to the costs judge under section 11, with a public funding costs assessment.
The court’s approach to earlier authorities
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Appellate history
- Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — dismissed the appeal with costs.
- Queen’s Bench Division (Buckley J) — dismissed the appellant’s negligence claim in a judgment dated 31 July 2002. That decision was appealed to the Court of Appeal.
Lower court decision
Key cases cited
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