Southport Corpn v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd

An unusual stranding of a vessel in ordinary conditions may provide prima facie evidence of negligence where the vessel was under the defendants’ management and such an event would not ordinarily occur with proper care. A defendant relying on steering failure must provide an explanation consistent with due diligence; a mere assertion that the steering failed is insufficient. The majority held the shipowners liable in negligence and allowed the appeal against them. Denning LJ further held that the oil discharge constituted a public nuisance, for which necessity is a defence only where the necessity was unavoidable and arose without the defendant’s fault. Direct trespass requires a physical act directly onto the claimant’s land, while private nuisance requires use or control of land from which the nuisance proceeds.

The Southport Corporation claimed damages after about 400 tons of fuel oil were discharged from the tanker Inverpool when it stranded on a revetment wall in the Ribble estuary. The oil was carried by the tide onto the Corporation’s foreshore and into its Marine Lake. The claims were framed in trespass, nuisance and negligence against the shipowners and the master.

Devlin J found that the vessel had lost control because of damage to the stern frame, rejected the pleaded allegations of negligent navigation, and entered judgment for the defendants. The Corporation appealed, challenging the treatment of the unexplained steering failure, the burden of proof, the adequacy of the pleadings, and the defence of necessity.

By a majority, Singleton LJ and Denning LJ allowed the appeal against the shipowners. The appeal against the master was dismissed, judgment being entered for the Corporation against the owners with damages to be assessed. Morris LJ dissented and would have dismissed the appeal.

1. Negligence and res ipsa loquitur. Singleton LJ held that the stranding was an unusual event which would not ordinarily occur in the channel, even in bad weather, if proper care were taken. It therefore called for an explanation. Applying the principle in Scott v London and St Katherine’s Docks Company, the defendants’ explanation had to be consistent with due diligence. They gave no adequate evidence about the condition of the stern post or stern frame before the voyage, or how the damage occurred. The inference of negligence therefore remained. Denning LJ agreed that, even if the legal burden remained on the Corporation, the facts spoke for themselves.
2. Burden in cases of an uncontrolled vessel. Denning LJ also applied The Merchant Prince. Where a vessel runs onto an obstruction and relies on steering failure, the ship must explain how the failure occurred and prove that the result was unavoidable. It was insufficient merely to assert that the steering had jammed.
3. Nuisance and trespass. Denning LJ held that the discharge was not direct trespass because it occurred in the estuary and reached the land only through the tide. It was not private nuisance because no land was used or controlled by the defendants. It was, however, capable of constituting public nuisance, and a person suffering special damage could recover. Necessity could excuse the discharge only if it was unavoidable and arose without the defendants’ fault.
4. Pleadings and duty. The majority rejected the argument that the case was confined to the master’s pleaded navigation faults. The defendants’ own failure to disclose or explain the relevant condition of the vessel could not create a pleading advantage. Singleton LJ also stated that those responsible for a ship owed persons on shore a duty to act reasonably and not unnecessarily to cause foreseeable injury.
5. Dissent. Morris LJ considered that the pleaded case concerned negligent navigation, not the owners’ decision to send an allegedly defective vessel to sea. He regarded the evidence as reasonably consistent with damage caused by sea and weather conditions, and distinguished The Merchant Prince because that case concerned a collision with a vessel at anchor and expressly pleaded inevitable accident.

1. Court of Appeal: Appeal allowed against the shipowners, with costs and damages to be assessed. The appeal against the master was dismissed. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was granted.
2. High Court, Devlin J: Judgment had been given for the defendants on the Corporation’s claims in trespass, nuisance and negligence.