Attorney-General v PYA Quarries Ltd

A public nuisance is one which materially affects the reasonable comfort and convenience of a class of the public. The affected class need not include every person in the neighbourhood. It is enough that a representative cross-section is affected.

The inquiry is factual. A nuisance may also be public where its range is so widespread, or its effect so indiscriminate, that proceedings should reasonably be taken on behalf of the community. Evidence of the cumulative effect on individual residents is admissible and may establish the public nuisance.

Where a nuisance existed when proceedings began, an injunction is ordinarily available. Later remedial measures justify withholding an injunction only where the nuisance has been effectively abated.

The Attorney-General, acting on the relation of two local authorities, brought proceedings alleging that quarrying operations caused a public nuisance through projected stones, vibration and dust. Oliver J granted an injunction restraining the quarry company from operating so as to project stones or splinters beyond the quarry or to occasion a public nuisance through dust or vibration.

The company appealed only against the provisions concerning dust and vibration. It argued that the judge had applied principles appropriate to private nuisance, had given insufficient weight to expert evidence and had failed to focus on conditions when the writ was issued. The central questions were whether the vibration and dust affected a sufficient section of the neighbourhood to constitute public nuisances and whether subsequent remedial measures made injunctions unnecessary.

1. Appeal dismissed unanimously. Romer LJ delivered the principal judgment. Denning LJ agreed and gave additional reasons. Parker LJ agreed with both judgments. The evidence established that public nuisances from vibration and dust existed when proceedings began and had not been wholly abated by the trial.

2. Per Romer LJ, a nuisance is public where it materially affects the reasonable comfort and convenience of a class of the public. The relevant sphere may ordinarily be described as the neighbourhood. Whether the community within that sphere contains enough people to constitute a class is a question of fact. Every member need not be affected; proof that a representative cross-section suffered the interference is sufficient.

3. Denning LJ stated a complementary test. A nuisance is public where its range is so widespread, or its effect so indiscriminate, that it would be unreasonable to expect one person to undertake proceedings and the matter should instead be pursued on the community's responsibility. The quarry's stones, vibration and dust met that standard.

4. Individual experiences were admissible. A public nuisance will commonly be proved through the cumulative effect upon people within its sphere of influence. A sufficiently large collection of interferences which would individually amount to private nuisances may therefore establish a public nuisance.

5. The vibration evidence established genuine and widespread fear and personal discomfort. Proof of structural damage was unnecessary. Reasonable residents who reasonably believed that their homes were being seriously shaken could suffer actionable harassment and distress even though expert evidence showed that the vibration was unlikely to damage the buildings.

6. The dust polluted the air and affected enough residents to constitute a class. Its seasonal character did not prevent liability. Reports and residents' evidence showed that substantial dust escaped from the crushing plant and that the problem existed both when proceedings commenced and at trial.

7. A claimant who proves that a nuisance existed when the writ was issued is prima facie entitled to an injunction. If it has been abated before trial, the court will ordinarily withhold immediate relief and grant liberty to apply should it recur. Here, blasting remained capable of producing serious vibration and the crusher continued to emit dust. The nuisances were avoidable by proper care, and the company's history of delay and indifference reinforced the need for injunctions.

8. Denning LJ added that, although private nuisance ordinarily requires repetition or continuance, an isolated act may constitute a public nuisance where the circumstances require vindication of the public right. Any contempt response to an unavoidable isolated incident would depend upon the company's fault and was a matter for the Attorney-General.

• Court of Appeal: The company's appeal against the injunctions relating to vibration and dust was dismissed unanimously with costs. The injunctions remained in force.
• High Court: Oliver J, by an order dated 25 April 1956, restrained the company from operating the quarry so as to project stones or splinters beyond its confines or to occasion a nuisance to the public through dust or vibration.