In re Satterthwaite’s Will Trusts

A testamentary gift described by a name or style suggesting an animal hospital or similar charitable undertaking is ordinarily construed as a gift for a charitable purpose, rather than as a benefit to a private trader, unless the circumstances show that the testator knew the enterprise was private. Exact correspondence between the stated name and an institution creates a strong, but not conclusive, presumption in its favour. Where the named charitable application cannot be identified or performed, the court may apply the gift cy-près if the will discloses a general charitable intention transcending the specified mode. That intention may be gathered from the whole residuary scheme, even though one named recipient is not legally charitable.

The testatrix left her residuary estate in approximately equal shares to nine organisations associated with animal welfare. One share was given to the London Animal Hospital. Arthur Stewart Rich claimed that description because he had formerly carried on a veterinary business under that style, although he had used his own name by the date of the will. The Blue Cross, formerly Our Dumb Friends League, was identified by the High Court as the intended recipient because it operated an animal hospital in London.

Rich appealed. The central questions were whether the gift identified Rich, the Blue Cross, or an identifiable charitable institution and, if not, whether the share could be applied cy-près pursuant to a general charitable intention.

The Court of Appeal unanimously rejected Rich’s claim and held that the Blue Cross had not been sufficiently identified. The one-ninth share therefore took effect only as a valid charitable bequest, with a scheme to be settled in chambers.

1. Construction of the gift. Russell LJ held that an animal hospital is prima facie charitable because it promotes kindness and discourages cruelty, but the activity is not legally charitable if carried on for private profit. A name which appears to an uninformed testator to describe a charitable undertaking should ordinarily be construed as indicating the charitable purpose, rather than the business or its proprietor, unless the circumstances show knowledge of the private enterprise. The surrounding gifts supported that construction through the principle of noscitur a sociis.
2. Identity by name. Harman LJ applied the principle in N.S.P.C.C. v. Scottish N.S.P.C.C. (1915 Appeal Cases 207) at p. 212, that accurate use of a name creates a strong presumption against a rival lacking that name. The presumption is not conclusive, but it could not assist Rich because the business had ceased to trade under the relevant style before the will was made. The evidence supporting the Blue Cross was also too vague and unsupported to establish identification.
3. Charitable intention and cy-près. If a particular charitable application cannot be performed, the court may direct a cy-près application where the will shows a general charitable intention transcending that particular mode. The intention was apparent from the whole residuary scheme, directed towards the care or cure of animals. The inclusion of an organisation that was not legally charitable did not defeat that intention.
4. Order. The share was declared to be a valid charitable bequest only. A scheme was to be brought into chambers. Proceedings were stayed against all parties except the Attorney-General, and costs were ordered to come out of the one-ninth share. Diplock LJ agreed with the judgments delivered.

1. Court of Appeal In [1966] EWCA Civ 3, the court rejected Rich’s claim, declined to identify the Blue Cross as beneficiary, and directed that the share be treated as a valid charitable bequest applied cy-près.
2. High Court Mr Justice Plowman had identified the Blue Cross as the recipient of the share given to the London Animal Hospital and had applied another unidentified share cy-près.