Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food

A statutory discretion must be exercised consistently with the policy and objects of the enactment which confers it. Permissive language does not make executive discretion immune from judicial review.

A court may require reconsideration where the decision-maker misconstrues the legislation, relies on irrelevant considerations, omits relevant matters or uses the discretion to frustrate the statutory purpose. Under section 19(3)(b) of the Agricultural Marketing Act 1958, the Minister could reject frivolous, repetitive, insubstantial or otherwise unsuitable complaints. He could not lawfully reject a genuine and substantial complaint merely because it raised wide issues, challenged an industry's self-governing machinery or might lead to politically inconvenient remedial action.

Milk producers in the South Eastern Region complained that the Milk Marketing Board's regional price differentials did not reflect variations in transport and marketing costs. They alleged that the resulting cross-subsidy was contrary to their interests and the public interest. Arbitration was unsuitable, and the Board's voting structure left little prospect of an internal remedy.

The producers asked the Minister to refer their complaint to the Committee of Investigation under section 19(3)(b) of the Agricultural Marketing Act 1958. The Minister refused because the complaint raised wide issues affecting the national price structure and should, in his view, be resolved through the Scheme's self-governing machinery.

The Divisional Court ordered the Minister to reconsider the complaint according to law. The Court of Appeal set that order aside by a majority, Lord Denning M.R. dissenting. The producers appealed. The central question was whether the Minister's discretion was unfettered and whether his disclosed reasons showed that it had been exercised lawfully.

Appeal allowed by a majority of four to one. Lord Reid, Lord Hodson, Lord Pearce and Lord Upjohn concluded that the Minister had not exercised his discretion according to law. Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest dissented.

1. The majority rejected the contention that every genuine complaint had to be referred. Section 19(3)(b) conferred a discretion. The Minister could refuse complaints which were frivolous, vexatious, repetitive, insubstantial, more suitable for arbitration or otherwise unsuitable for investigation.

2. The discretion was not legally unfettered. Its nature and limits had to be derived from the Agricultural Marketing Act 1958 as a whole. Parliament conferred the power so that it would promote, rather than frustrate, the Act's policy and objects. The approach in Julius v Lord Bishop of Oxford 5 App Cas 214 confirmed that apparently permissive words must be construed in their statutory context.

3. Judicial review was available where the Minister refused to consider the relevant matter, misdirected himself in law, relied on a wholly irrelevant consideration or wholly omitted a relevant consideration. These grounds ultimately asked whether he had exercised the statutory discretion lawfully. The principles stated in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 were accepted.

4. The Minister's reasons disclosed a misunderstanding of section 19. The complaint's breadth and its effect on other regions favoured independent investigation rather than exclusion. The investigation machinery was intended as a safeguard where a compulsory scheme's democratic administration might operate against a minority or the public interest. Treating the Board's self-governing character as a reason against investigation therefore frustrated the statutory safeguard.

5. The prospect that a favourable report might create pressure to make a statutory order was not a lawful reason to prevent investigation. The Minister retained a separate discretion after receiving the Committee's published report. He could not avoid that statutory process merely because its outcome might be inconvenient.

6. A Minister's failure to give reasons does not necessarily prevent judicial review. Where the circumstances strongly favour exercising a statutory power and no reason is given for refusing, the court may infer that no lawful reason existed.

7. Lord Morris would have dismissed the appeal. He considered that the Minister had addressed the complaint and had permissibly adopted a policy favouring the Scheme's self-governing machinery. In his view, no irrelevant consideration or material omission had been established.

The matter was remitted to the Queen's Bench Division with a direction that the Minister be required to consider the complaint according to law. The Minister was not ordered to refer the complaint or to reach any predetermined result.

1. House of Lords: The producers' appeal was allowed by a majority of four to one. The matter was remitted so that the Minister could be required to reconsider the complaint according to law: [1968] UKHL 1; [1968] AC 997; [1968] 2 WLR 924.
2. Court of Appeal: On 27 July 1966, Diplock and Russell L.JJ., Lord Denning M.R. dissenting, allowed the Minister's appeal and set aside the Divisional Court's order.
3. Queen's Bench Divisional Court: On 3 February 1966, Lord Parker L.C.J., Sachs and Nield JJ. ordered the Minister to consider the complaint according to law, having regard to relevant considerations and excluding irrelevant considerations.