Langston v Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers

Under the Industrial Relations Act 1971, a complaint under section 33(3)(a) about pressure on an employer to penalise a non-union worker must be brought by the employer, not the worker. A worker’s complaint may nevertheless fall under section 96 where threats may have induced the employer to breach an arguable implied contractual right to attend and perform available work. The question whether such a right exists need not be decided at the threshold stage. Nor should the complaint be rejected summarily for lack of an industrial dispute: a dispute between workers may evolve into one involving the employer or the affected worker, and the facts may require investigation.

Mr Langston, an employee of Chrysler United Kingdom Ltd, resigned from the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers after opposing the closed-shop policy. Other workers objected to working with him, and Chrysler suspended him on full pay. He complained to the National Industrial Relations Court about threats said to have prevented his return to work. The complaint was redirected from the works convenor to the union, and Chrysler was joined as a respondent. The Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction, treating it as one under section 33(3)(a) of the Industrial Relations Act 1971. The appeal concerned whether the complaint could proceed under section 96, including the existence of an arguable contractual right to work and an industrial dispute within section 167.

1. Appeal allowed and remitted. The appeal was allowed unanimously and the complaint was remitted to the National Industrial Relations Court for hearing on the merits. There was no order as to costs, and leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused.
2. Complaint under section 33(3)(a). The court held that sections 101(1)(c) and 105(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1971 meant that, for a complaint under section 33(3)(a), the complainant had to be the employer. The worker against whom the action was indirectly taken could not bring that complaint himself. Lord Justice Stephenson also referred to sections 103(1) and 105(2) in reaching the same construction.
3. Complaint under section 96. The homemade complaint and notice of appeal were wide enough to raise a complaint under section 96. It was arguable that the employment contract included an implied right to attend work and have the opportunity to perform available work. The court did not finally decide whether that term existed. The older reasoning in (1940) 2 K.B. did not make the claim unarguable, particularly in light of later authority recognising a protectable right to work in (1966) 2 Q.B. 33 and (1972) 2 Ch. 305. The unregistered union was not a statutory trade union, so the section 96 exceptions did not apply.
4. Industrial dispute. A dispute initially between workers could develop into a dispute between the employer and workers, or between the employer and the affected worker, concerning suspension, termination, or employment terms. The decision in (1973) 1 W.L.R. 793 did not justify rejecting the complaint without evidence. The present facts differed materially because Mr Langston did not welcome being excluded from work, and Chrysler’s position had not been fully investigated.
5. Remedy. The Master of the Rolls observed that, if the matter constituted an industrial dispute, section 132 barred a tort remedy and the statutory Industrial Court procedure was the appropriate route. Mr Langston was therefore entitled to have his section 96 complaint heard.

• Court of Appeal — On 19 December 1973, the appeal was allowed and the complaint was remitted to the National Industrial Relations Court: [1973] EWCA Civ 7.
• National Industrial Relations Court — On 27 February 1973, the complaint was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.