R v Miah (Waddington v Miah alias Ullah)

Penal legislation does not ordinarily authorise punishment for conduct preceding its commencement. Clear statutory language is required to displace that principle.

The offences in sections 24 and 26 of the Immigration Act 1971 therefore applied only to conduct occurring after those provisions came into force. Transitional provisions making the Act applicable in future to persons who had entered earlier did not convert their earlier conduct into offences under the Act. Nor did provisions preserving earlier official acts or extending the time for prosecuting specified offences under former legislation produce that result.

The respondent entered the United Kingdom in 1971 using an altered passport and remained in possession of it in 1972. Sections 24 and 26 of the Immigration Act 1971 did not come into force until 1 January 1973. He was nevertheless convicted at the Crown Court at Grimsby of illegal entry and possession of a false passport under those sections.

The Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, allowed his appeal and quashed the convictions: R v Miah [1974] 1 All ER 1110. It certified whether a person could be convicted under the 1971 Act for conduct occurring before the Act came into force, particularly under sections 24(1)(a) and 26(1)(d). The prosecution appealed to the House of Lords.

1. The appeal was dismissed unanimously. Lord Reid delivered the leading speech. Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Simon of Glaisdale and Lord Salmon expressly agreed with it. The respondent's convictions remained quashed, and he was awarded his costs in the House.

2. Per Lord Reid, legislation, particularly criminal legislation, is strongly presumed not to operate retrospectively. It was scarcely credible that Parliament intended to permit conviction for an act or omission which was not an offence under the relevant enactment when committed. Article 11(2) of the Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations and article 7 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms reflected the same fundamental principle.

3. Sections 24(1)(a) and 26(1)(d) of the Immigration Act 1971 did not authorise conviction for conduct occurring before they came into force. Nothing in the transitional provisions gave those offences retrospective effect.

4. Section 34(1)(a) made the 1971 Act applicable in future to entrants who had arrived before or after commencement. It permitted future distinctions based on matters such as an earlier entry, but it did not subject an entrant to punishment under the Act for earlier conduct.

5. Section 34(1)(b) preserved the effect of things previously done under or for the purposes of the former immigration laws where corresponding action could be taken under the 1971 Act. It did not encompass conduct contrary to those laws or offences committed against them.

6. Section 35(3) applied the extended time limit in section 28 to qualifying earlier offences under section 4A of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962. It did not revive offences already time-barred when the 1971 Act was passed, and it did not support prosecution under the new offences. The House did not decide whether the respondent could have been charged under the former immigration laws.

1. House of Lords: The prosecution's appeal was dismissed unanimously. The decision of the Court of Appeal was affirmed, and the respondent was awarded his costs in the House.
2. Court of Appeal, Criminal Division: The respondent's appeal was allowed and his convictions were quashed: R v Miah [1974] 1 All ER 1110. The court certified the question whether offences under the Immigration Act 1971 could be committed by conduct preceding its commencement.
3. Crown Court at Grimsby: The respondent was convicted on 10 October 1973 of illegal entry under section 24 and possession of a false passport under section 26 of the Immigration Act 1971.