Director of Public Prosecutions v Newbury

A person commits unlawful-act manslaughter where that person intentionally performs an unlawful and objectively dangerous act which causes death. The prosecution need not prove that the defendant foresaw harm or knew that the act was unlawful or dangerous.

An act is dangerous where all sober and reasonable people would recognise that it exposes another person to at least a risk of some harm. The required guilty mind is the intention to perform the acts constituting the offence, rather than an intention or realisation that someone may be frightened or harmed.

Two boys, each aged about 15, jointly pushed part of a paving stone from a bridge into the path of an approaching train. The stone entered the driving cab and killed the guard. Each boy was convicted of manslaughter, and the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) dismissed their appeals against conviction.

In these consolidated appeals, the certified question was whether a defendant whose mind was unaffected by drink or drugs could properly be convicted of manslaughter without having foreseen that the act might cause harm to another person.

1. The appeals were dismissed unanimously. Lord Salmon delivered the leading speech. Lord Diplock, Lord Simon of Glaisdale and Lord Kilbrandon agreed with it, while Lord Edmund-Davies delivered a concurring speech.

2. Per Lord Salmon, a defendant is guilty of unlawful-act manslaughter where the prosecution proves that the defendant intentionally performed an unlawful and dangerous act which inadvertently caused death. It is unnecessary to prove that the defendant knew the act was unlawful or dangerous, or foresaw that it might cause harm. The statement of the law in R v Larkin was approved and applied.

3. Per Lord Salmon, Reg v Church [1966] 1 QB 59 did not qualify that principle. It explained the meaning of a dangerous act. The test is objective: all sober and reasonable people must recognise that the act exposes another person to at least the risk of some harm, although the anticipated harm need not be serious.

4. Per Lord Salmon, manslaughter requires a guilty mind, but unlawful-act manslaughter is an offence of basic intent. The required mental element is the intention to perform the acts constituting the offence. Neither an intention to frighten or harm nor a realisation that fright or harm is likely forms an additional requirement. Any contrary reading of Lord Denning MR’s observations in Gray v Barr [1971] 2 QB 554 was rejected, and judges were directed to cease using those observations in their literal sense.

5. Per Lord Edmund-Davies, Church marked no departure from the established law. It rejected only the proposition that every unlawful act causing death necessarily amounts to manslaughter. The relevant act must be unlawful and possess the objectively dangerous character identified in that case.

6. Per Lord Edmund-Davies, section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 did not alter when intention, foresight or another mental state must be proved. It concerned how a required mental state is determined. Any broader alteration of the constituents of unlawful-act manslaughter was a matter for legislation.

1. House of Lords: The consolidated appeals against conviction were dismissed unanimously.

2. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The appeals against conviction were dismissed. No citation is stated in the judgment.

3. Trial: Each appellant was convicted of manslaughter after a jury trial.