Mount v R.

Evidence of a non-defendant’s bad character is inadmissible under Criminal Justice Act 2003 section 100(1)(b) unless it has substantial probative value on a matter of substantial importance. It cannot be used merely to invite speculation.

A judge need not leave accident to the jury where there is no evidential basis for finding that a forceful fatal stabbing may have been unintended. Nor does the possible lawfulness of producing a knife affect the issues of stabbing or intent once a defendant’s case that the knife made no contact has been rejected.

An objective direction on unlawful-act manslaughter is proper where the jury are sure of an unlawful stabbing but not murderous intent. In fixing a life prisoner’s minimum term, the statutory starting point applicable at the date of the murder must be used, while knife use may remain a substantial aggravating feature.

Rickie Joseph Mount was convicted at the Crown Court at Maidstone of murdering Adam Beaney after an encounter in which he had armed himself with a knife. He was sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 20 years, less time spent on remand.

He appealed against conviction and sentence. The conviction appeal challenged the exclusion of evidence about the bad character of the person who found the deceased, the refusal to leave accident to the jury, the treatment of self-defence, and the direction on manslaughter. The sentence appeal challenged the minimum term.

The central issues were whether any evidential foundation required the disputed defences or alternative verdict to be left to the jury, and whether the statutory sentencing framework had been correctly applied.

1. The appeal against conviction was dismissed. The proposed evidence concerning the finder of the body had no substantial probative value on a matter in issue. His old conviction for possessing a knife and his interest in knives did not tend to show that he had stabbed the deceased. Section 100 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 prevents bad-character evidence from being used merely to generate speculation.
2. The judge correctly withheld accident from the jury. The appellant’s own case was that the knife never touched the deceased. Once that account was rejected, there was no evidence capable of supporting an unintended but forceful penetration through the sternum. The evidence instead pointed to a deliberate forward movement with the knife or a securely held knife meeting the deceased’s chest. A conclusion of accident would have rested on guesswork.
3. The full defence of self-defence was not available and was not pursued. The possible lawfulness of producing the knife to frighten the deceased did not affect whether the appellant later stabbed him or his intention when doing so. The judge was therefore not required to give a separate self-defence direction for that limited purpose.
4. The manslaughter direction was correct. Following the approach in R v. Church [1966] 1 QB 59, and the objective standard confirmed in DPP v. Newbury [1977] AC 500, the jury could convict of unlawful-act manslaughter if sure of an unlawful stabbing but not of an intent to kill or cause really serious bodily harm, provided that sober and reasonable people would inevitably have recognised a risk of some harm.
5. The appeal against sentence was allowed in part. The applicable starting point was 15 years under paragraph 6 of Schedule 21 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Paragraph 5A was not in force when the murder was committed. Carrying and using the knife nevertheless materially aggravated the offence. Giving proper weight to the appellant’s good character and personal circumstances, the minimum term was reduced to 17 years, less time spent on remand. The life sentence remained in force.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In Mount v R [2010] EWCA Crim 2974, dismissed the appeal against conviction and allowed the appeal against sentence only by reducing the minimum term.
• Crown Court at Maidstone: Convicted the appellant of murder and imposed life imprisonment with a minimum term of 20 years, less 253 days on remand.