R v Camplin (Director of Public Prosecutions v Camplin)

Under section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957, provocation requires both an actual loss of self-control and provocation sufficient to make a reasonable person react as the accused did. The reasonable person has the ordinary power of self-control expected of a person of the accused’s sex and age. In other respects, the jury may attribute characteristics of the accused which affect the gravity of the provocation.

Once there is evidence capable of showing provoked loss of self-control, the objective question belongs exclusively to the jury. Previous common-law restrictions on what could constitute provocation, including the exclusion of words alone and the rule requiring personal characteristics to be disregarded, ceased to govern following the 1957 Act.

A 15-year-old boy killed an adult man by striking him with a heavy kitchen utensil. He alleged that the deceased had sexually assaulted him and then laughed at him. His sole defence to murder was provocation.

The trial judge directed the jury to consider the reaction of a reasonable adult, rather than a reasonable boy of the accused’s age. The jury convicted him of murder. The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) held that this was a misdirection, allowed his appeal and substituted a conviction for manslaughter.

The prosecution appealed to the House of Lords. The certified question was whether, under section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957, the jury should assess a 15-year-old accused by reference to a reasonable adult or a reasonable person of the same age.

1. The appeal was dismissed unanimously. Lord Diplock delivered the leading speech. Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest agreed with his proposed direction, while Lord Fraser of Tullybelton and Lord Scarman agreed with his reasoning. Lord Simon of Glaisdale reached the same conclusion by substantially similar reasoning.

2. Per Lord Diplock, section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957 retained a dual test. The provocation must actually have caused the accused to lose self-control, and it must have been capable of making a reasonable person react as the accused did. Once there is evidence of provoked loss of self-control, the objective question is one of opinion for the jury alone.

3. The reasonable person is an ordinary person of either sex who is not exceptionally excitable or pugnacious. That person possesses the degree of self-control which society is entitled to expect. For the statutory test, however, the person must have the power of self-control expected of an ordinary person of the accused’s sex and age. The jury may also attribute other characteristics of the accused which, in its opinion, affect the gravity of the particular provocation.

4. The jury must consider both whether such a person might lose self-control and whether that person might react as the accused did. The judge may identify considerations which could assist the jury, but must make clear that their weight is for the jury. Evidence from witnesses about how a reasonable person would react is inadmissible because that evaluative judgment belongs to the jury.

5. Section 3 abolished the common-law rules governing what conduct could constitute provocation, including the rule that words alone were generally insufficient. It also displaced the unqualified proposition in Bedder that unusual physical characteristics must be ignored. Lord Diplock concluded that Bedder, Mancini and Holmes should no longer be treated as authorities governing the post-Act law of provocation.

6. The direction requiring the jury to disregard the accused’s age improperly restricted the statutory function of the jury. The Court of Appeal had therefore correctly quashed the murder conviction and substituted manslaughter.

1. House of Lords: The prosecution’s appeal was dismissed unanimously. The substituted conviction for manslaughter remained in force.

2. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The defendant’s appeal was allowed because the direction requiring comparison with a reasonable adult was a misdirection. A conviction for manslaughter was substituted for the murder conviction.

3. Trial before Boreham J: The jury was directed to apply the standard of a reasonable adult and convicted the defendant of murder.