Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v Evans

Judicial review supervises the legality of a decision-making process. It does not authorise the court to substitute its view of the merits for that of the designated authority. Review remains available for procedural unfairness, self-misdirection, reliance on irrelevant matters, neglect of relevant matters and manifest unreasonableness.

A statutory power to dismiss a probationary office-holder must be exercised by reference to the prescribed criteria. Where dismissal requires something adverse against the office-holder, fairness ordinarily requires disclosure of the allegations and an opportunity to answer them. An authority cannot circumvent those duties by threatening an unlawful dismissal to procure a resignation.

A probationary constable was required by the Chief Constable to resign or face dismissal under regulation 16 of the Police Regulations 1971. The Chief Constable believed that he possessed an absolute discretion. He relied on adverse allegations concerning the constable's domestic circumstances and attitude to authority without disclosing the material or allowing an explanation. Some of the information was false.

Woolf J held in the Divisional Court that the procedure was unfair but granted no substantive relief. The Court of Appeal upheld that conclusion and declared the Chief Constable's decision void. The Chief Constable appealed. The issues were whether the forced resignation was lawful, the proper scope of judicial review, and the remedy available after the probationary period had expired.

1. Disposition. The House unanimously dismissed the appeal but varied the Court of Appeal's order. Lord Brightman delivered the leading speech. Lord Fraser and Lord Roskill expressly agreed with it, while Lord Hailsham and Lord Bridge concurred in the resulting order.

2. Qualified statutory power. Per Lord Brightman, the power under regulation 16 of the Police Regulations 1971 was not absolute. It could be exercised only after due consideration of whether the probationer was physically or mentally fitted for office or was likely to become an efficient and well-conducted constable. Lord Hailsham likewise held that the Chief Constable had asked himself the wrong question by treating his discretion as absolute.

3. Procedural fairness. Per Lord Brightman, the constable's office fell within the third category identified in Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40: dismissal required something adverse against the office-holder. The constable therefore had to be told the allegations and allowed to give a defence or explanation. The supposedly adverse factors were never fairly put to him, and he was denied any opportunity to answer. The Chief Constable's misunderstanding of his power and failure to observe natural justice rendered the process unlawful.

4. Delegated inquiries. Lord Hailsham and Lord Bridge accepted that factual investigation could be delegated, but the ultimate decision remained with the Chief Constable. They considered that the complaint must be made clear, the constable's response must be accurately reported, and the report or its substance should be disclosed for comment before the decision. This guidance reinforced the conclusion that the procedure adopted was unfair.

5. Scope of judicial review. Per Lord Brightman and Lord Hailsham, judicial review concerns the legality of the decision-making process and is not an appeal on the merits. The Court of Appeal's suggestion that the reviewing court could decide whether the result itself was fair and reasonable was too broad. Review nevertheless extends to self-misdirection, irrelevant considerations, failure to consider relevant matters and a decision so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could make it, consistently with Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223.

6. Coerced resignation and remedy. Per Lord Brightman, an authority cannot use an invalid threat of dismissal to compel resignation. The Chief Constable acted unlawfully and in breach of regulation 16. Reinstatement by mandamus was refused because it would risk usurping the present Chief Constable's powers and would create serious practical difficulties. The House declared that the constable was entitled to the same rights and remedies, excluding reinstatement, as if his services had been unlawfully dispensed with under regulation 16(1).

1. House of Lords: The Chief Constable's appeal was dismissed. The Court of Appeal's order was affirmed with a variation substituting declarations that the forced resignation was unlawful and that the constable retained the rights and remedies, excluding reinstatement, available following an unlawful dismissal.

2. Court of Appeal: The court upheld the finding of procedural unfairness and declared void the decision requiring resignation or dismissal. The Chief Constable appealed to the House of Lords.

3. Divisional Court: Woolf J held that the Chief Constable had failed to observe the required standards of fairness, but declined to grant substantive relief because the probationary period had expired. The constable appealed and the Chief Constable cross-appealed.