Chief Personnel Officer v Amalgamated Workers’ Union (Trinidad and Tobago)

An industrial court with broad statutory powers may make a fair and just order relating to the matters in a trade dispute, including reinstatement and back pay, even without a separately pleaded claim for those remedies. Prolonged failure to follow a grievance procedure may fundamentally undermine disciplinary proceedings and render a later dismissal unfair. Appellate complaints must also be assessed in their procedural context. A party who secured dismissal of a related dispute on the basis that the first decision had resolved the matter may be unable to complain that the first court exceeded the dispute’s scope. The appeal was dismissed because no substantial miscarriage of justice had occurred.

An employee was suspended without pay after being charged with stealing fuel. He was acquitted in the Magistrates’ Court, but disciplinary proceedings were later commenced and continued for several years. The employer then failed to issue its decision within the period required by the grievance procedure in a collective agreement.

The Union reported a trade dispute concerning that failure. The Industrial Court ordered reinstatement and payment of salary and benefits from the date of suspension. A second dispute concerning termination was dismissed as having been adjudicated by the first decision. The Court of Appeal dismissed the employer’s appeal. The Privy Council considered its jurisdiction, the scope of the Industrial Court’s powers, procedural fairness, deductions for other earnings and substantial miscarriage of justice.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Board had jurisdiction under section 109(1)(a) of the Republican Constitution. Proceedings before the Industrial Court were civil proceedings, and the Court of Appeal’s decision was a final decision in civil proceedings. Sundry Workers (represented by Antigua Workers Union) v Antigua Hotel and Tourist Association [1993] 1 WLR 1250; (1993) 42 WIR 145 was applied. Section 18(1) of the Industrial Relations Act of 1972 limited challenges to the Industrial Court in the Court of Appeal but did not restrict a further constitutional appeal to the Board.
2. The first trade dispute concerned the employer’s overall failure to deal with the disciplinary process in a timely and proper way. The failure to issue the report within ten working days was one element of that wider dispute. The Industrial Court was entitled to consider the prolonged unpaid suspension, the delay in commencing and completing the disciplinary proceedings, and the employer’s responsibility for the delay.
3. Sections 10(1)(b) and 10(3) of the Industrial Relations Act of 1972 conferred deliberately broad powers to make an order relating to any matter in dispute and to make an order considered fair and just. Reinstatement and payment of salary and benefits related to the dispute because those remedies arose from and sought to remedy the prolonged failure to follow the grievance procedure. A separate dispute about reinstatement was unnecessary.
4. The employer’s failures substantially undermined the legality of the disciplinary process and rendered any subsequent dismissal for the alleged offence unfair. Reinstatement was appropriate because there was no suggestion that the employee could not perform his duties, and he had not voluntarily resigned or abandoned his position. The discretion to order reinstatement was recognised in Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v Evans [1982] 1 WLR 1155 and Jhagroo v Teaching Service Commission (2002) 61 WIR 510.
5. The complaint that earnings from other work should have been deducted was too late because it had not been raised before the Industrial Court or developed before the Court of Appeal. The allegations of natural injustice, unfairness, irrationality and error of law were rejected.
6. The employer had successfully obtained dismissal of the second trade dispute on the basis that the first decision had resolved the employee’s grievance. It was therefore unjust to give weight to its argument that reinstatement and salary from the date of suspension fell outside the first dispute. Section 18(4) applied because no substantial miscarriage of justice had occurred. The damages issue did not arise.

• Privy Council: Appeal dismissed.
• Court of Appeal of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago: Appeal from the Industrial Court dismissed; no order for costs.
• Industrial Court: The first trade dispute was upheld. Reinstatement and payment of salary and benefits from the date of suspension were ordered. The second trade dispute was dismissed as having been adjudicated by the first decision.