Law v National Greyhound Racing Club Ltd

Judicial review is confined to activities of a public nature. A domestic tribunal whose authority over participants derives solely from contract remains a private body, even where its disciplinary decisions affect many members of the public or serve an important public interest.

Sections 29 and 31 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 regulate the procedure for judicial review. They do not enlarge the High Court’s jurisdiction to review private or domestic decisions. A person challenging such a contractual disciplinary decision may therefore seek ordinary private-law remedies, including a declaration, injunction or damages.

The National Greyhound Racing Club appealed from Walton J’s refusal to strike out an originating summons brought by a licensed greyhound trainer. The Club’s Stewards had suspended the trainer’s licence for six months after finding that a greyhound in his charge contained performance-affecting substances.

The trainer sought declarations, an injunction and damages on contractual and restraint-of-trade grounds. The Club contended that the public importance of maintaining the integrity of greyhound racing meant that any challenge had to be brought by judicial review under section 31 of the Supreme Court Act 1981.

The central issue was whether sections 29 and 31 extended judicial review to a domestic tribunal whose disciplinary jurisdiction derived solely from contract.

1. Appeal dismissed unanimously. Lawton, Fox and Slade LJJ held that the Stewards’ authority over the trainer derived wholly from the contractual arrangements embodied in the Club’s Rules of Racing. The Club was therefore a domestic tribunal in relation to the impugned disciplinary decision.

2. A body does not acquire a public-law jurisdiction merely because its work serves the public interest or its decisions have consequences for the public. Although suppressing malpractice in greyhound racing was important and the Club exercised judicial or quasi-judicial functions, its relevant powers were not derived from statute, statutory instrument, the Crown or any other public source.

3. Before the procedural reforms governing judicial review, certiorari did not lie against a private or domestic tribunal whose authority arose solely from contract. Lawton and Fox LJJ relied on Reg v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, Ex parte Lain [1967] 2 QB 864. Fox and Slade LJJ also relied on Reg v Post Office, Ex parte Byrne [1975] ICR 221.

4. Sections 29(1) and 31 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 did not enlarge that jurisdiction. Section 29(1) preserved the pre-existing classes of cases in which mandamus, prohibition and certiorari were available. Section 31 regulated the procedure for judicial review and permitted declarations or injunctions within that public-law jurisdiction; it did not bring purely private disputes within judicial review.

5. The mandatory word “shall” in section 31(1) required use of the judicial review procedure where public-law relief appropriately fell within section 31(2). It did not make judicial review compulsory or available in a contractual dispute that lay outside public law.

6. The trainer was consequently entitled to pursue ordinary proceedings for private-law relief. There was no procedural objection to his seeking a declaration under RSC Order 15, rule 16. Walton J had correctly refused to strike out the originating summons. The appeal was dismissed with costs, and leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused.

1. Court of Appeal: The Club’s appeal was dismissed unanimously. The trainer’s ordinary private-law proceedings were permitted to continue.
2. High Court, Chancery Division: Walton J refused the Club’s application to strike out the trainer’s originating summons for want of jurisdiction.