Modahl v British Athletic Federation Ltd

A claimant seeking damages for an allegedly unfair sporting disciplinary process must prove causation. Apparent bias alone does not establish compensable loss where the tribunal's decision was in fact reached without actual bias, was justified by the evidence then available, and there was no real and substantial chance that a properly constituted tribunal would have decided differently.

A later successful appeal based on fresh evidence does not show that the earlier decision caused loss. The court unanimously dismissed the appeal. The judges differed on whether the athlete and national governing body were contractually bound, but that issue was unnecessary to the result.

Modahl v British Athletic Federation Ltd concerned an athlete who was suspended and declared ineligible after positive doping tests. The British Athletic Federation's Disciplinary Committee rejected her challenge, but an Independent Appeal Panel later allowed her appeal after receiving fresh scientific evidence concerning possible bacterial degradation of the samples.

Douglas Brown J rejected her subsequent claim for contractual damages. He found no contract, no actual or apparent bias, and no loss. He also held that the fair appeal process cured any earlier deficiency.

On the athlete's appeal, the Court of Appeal considered whether a contract existed, its implied terms concerning disciplinary fairness, whether there had been bias, and whether any breach caused loss.

1. Appeal dismissed unanimously. The appellant could not recover damages. The judge's findings established that the Disciplinary Committee had reached its decision without actual bias and on evidence which justified it. The Independent Appeal Panel reached a different result only because it received fresh evidence that had not been available to the Committee.

2. Per Latham LJ, an enforceable contract could be implied from the athlete's continuing acceptance of the governing body's rules, its permission for her to compete, and the parties' reciprocal obligations. The contractual requirement of fairness was to be assessed across the disciplinary process as a whole. Applying the approach in Calvin v Carr, an appeal may cure an earlier defect where the ultimate result is fair. Latham LJ held that apparent bias was not, after the event, enough to establish a damages claim where the risk could be evaluated and excluded and the appeal process was untainted.

3. Jonathan Parker LJ considered that the evidence did not justify implying a contract. In any event, the absence of actual bias meant that apparent bias in selecting a committee member caused no loss, and the fair appeal cured any earlier unfairness.

4. Per Mance LJ, the long-term relationship governed by rules containing mutual rights and duties was contractual. Any implied duty was, however, limited at most to good-faith and careful appointment of suitable committee members. The Federation had not breached that duty. Even on the contrary assumption, the appellant had not proved a real and substantial chance of a different decision on the evidence available in December 1994. Human Rights Act 1998 considerations concerning apparent bias did not alter that conclusion.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal dismissed: [2001] EWCA Civ 1447.
• Queen's Bench Division (Douglas Brown J): The claim for contractual damages was rejected. The judge found no contract, no relevant bias, and no loss. No citation for that judgment is stated.