Tate & Lyle Industries Limited v Greater London Council

A riparian owner has no private right to the maintenance of a particular depth of navigable water where a change neither damages the land nor interferes with an established riparian right. Statutory authority provides immunity from public nuisance only for consequences which Parliament authorised expressly or by necessary implication. The undertaker must exercise its powers with reasonable care for others.

An individual who suffers particular damage from an unjustified obstruction of the public right of navigation may recover the reasonable cost of overcoming it. Damages exclude the loss that would have resulted even if the authorised works had been designed with proper care.

The Greater London Council constructed new Woolwich Ferry terminals under the London County Council (Improvements) Act 1962. Their design caused extensive siltation between the main Thames shipping channel and two licensed jetties serving Tate & Lyle's refinery. Tate & Lyle incurred £540,000 in additional dredging costs.

Forbes J found substantially for Tate & Lyle. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals of the Greater London Council and the Port of London Authority and dismissed the claims. The House considered whether either authority was liable in negligence, private nuisance or public nuisance, and whether statutory authority protected the Council from liability.

1. Appeal against the Greater London Council allowed by a majority; appeal against the Port of London Authority dismissed unanimously. Lord Templeman delivered the leading speech. Lord Keith of Kinkel, Lord Roskill and Lord Bridge of Harwich agreed. Lord Diplock agreed on the rejection of the claims based on riparian rights, contract, negligence and private nuisance, but dissented from the award concerning the raw sugar jetty.

2. Per Lord Templeman, riparian ownership did not confer a right to the maintenance of the existing depth of the Thames. The siltation neither obstructed access from the land to the water nor damaged the land or an acknowledged riparian right. It instead obstructed navigation between the shipping channel and the jetties. The jetties themselves were revocable structures erected on the Port Authority's riverbed and did not acquire riparian rights.

3. The licences to construct the jetties and dredge the channel and berth created no contractual right to a specified depth of water. Section 66(1)(b) of the Port of London Act 1968 conferred only the rights needed to erect and maintain the licensed structures. Consequently, the claims in negligence and private nuisance failed because Tate & Lyle had no relevant private right in the riverbed or depth of water.

4. The Thames was subject to a public right of navigation, including passage, loading and unloading. The avoidable siltation obstructed that right and caused Tate & Lyle particular damage. The company could therefore sue in public nuisance.

5. Statutory authority did not protect the Council from the consequences of its careless design. Applying the principle in Allen v Gulf Oil Refining Ltd [1981] AC 1001, statutory immunity covered the inevitable consequences of the authorised undertaking, provided the powers were exercised with reasonable care for others. Sections 17 and 50 of the London County Council (Improvements) Act 1962 neither transferred the Council's responsibility for design to the Port Authority nor immunised unnecessary siltation.

6. The Port Authority was not negligent. Nothing should have alerted it that the Council's engineers had selected a design producing unnecessary siltation. Approval of the plans neither adopted nor continued the nuisance.

7. Only three-quarters of the dredging expense was recoverable because one-quarter would have resulted from any proper design. The majority held that recovery extended to the raw sugar jetty despite its later authorisation. The Council remained liable for a public nuisance which subsequently caused particular damage. The trial judge's orders against the Council were restored with dredging damages reduced to £405,000 and corresponding interest reduced by 25 per cent. All claims against the Port Authority were dismissed.

1. House of Lords: The Council's successful appeal below was set aside. Forbes J's orders against it were restored, subject to a 25 per cent reduction in the dredging damages and related interest. The dismissal of the claims against the Port of London Authority was affirmed.

2. Court of Appeal, 28 May 1982: Allowed the appeals of the Greater London Council and the Port of London Authority and dismissed Tate & Lyle's claims.

3. High Court, Forbes J: Found substantially for Tate & Lyle and awarded damages against both authorities. The relevant orders were dated 15 May 1980 and 22 May 1981.