Housecroft v Burnett

Damages for non-economic personal injury loss should be assessed by reference to broad, conventional brackets that are updated over time. The exercise is not a rigid tariff or an arithmetical inflation calculation, and appellate intervention is limited to awards that are manifestly too high or too low or affected by an error of principle. For tetraplegia, pain, awareness, life expectancy and the preservation of speech, sight and hearing are material factors. Future care supplied gratuitously by a relative is valued by the reasonable and proper cost of meeting the claimant’s needs. It lies between nil and the full commercial rate, depending on the facts. A separate lost-years award is unnecessary where the effect is adequately reflected in the multiplier and double recovery is avoided.

The claimant, aged 16, suffered tetraplegia as a passenger in a car driven by the defendant. Liability was admitted. Kilner Brown J assessed total damages at £323,050, including £80,000 for pain, suffering and loss of amenity, £108,550 for future care and £56,000 for future loss of earnings.

She appealed, contending that each of those three heads was inadequate. The issues were whether the award for non-economic loss was too low, whether the future-care assessment properly allowed for outside assistance and her mother’s services, and whether compensation was required for the lost years resulting from reduced life expectancy.

Disposition. The appeal was dismissed unanimously. The total award of £323,050 was not disturbed.

1. Pain, suffering and loss of amenity. The principles in Wright v British Railways Board (1983) 2 AC 773 required conventional, broadly predictable brackets based on comparable awards. The Court of Appeal should not apply a rigid inflation multiplier. It should intervene only where an award is manifestly too high or too low, or rests on an error of principle. A fresh guideline of £75,000 in April 1985 was appropriate for an average case of tetraplegia. Pain or impairment of speech, sight or hearing justified an increase; lack of awareness or reduced life expectancy justified a reduction. The claimant’s case was an average example despite her age and intelligence, and £80,000 was more than adequate.
2. Future care. Following Donnelly v Joyce (1974) 1 QB 454, the relevant loss was the claimant’s need for care and the proper and reasonable cost of supplying it, not the identity of the person providing it. Gratuitous care by a relative was not automatically valued at either the full commercial rate or nil. The assessment depended on the facts and whether expenditure would be incurred. The commercial rate was a ceiling. The judge was entitled to make no separate provision for a replacement carer because the evidence supported the mother’s continued ability and willingness to care, and the award allowed for contingencies. He had, however, overlooked the need for a holiday break for the mother. The resulting addition was offset by the excessive award for non-economic loss.
3. Lost years and multiplier. Harris v Harris (1973) 1 Lloyd's Rep 445 remained binding on career interruption and marriage. Lost years were highly speculative and were better addressed by a modest adjustment to the multiplier than by calculating future living expenses. The multiplier of 10 more than provided for the lost years. The court also warned against duplicating compensation for lost marriage prospects between loss of earnings and loss of amenity.
4. The appeal was dismissed, with legal aid taxation for the appellant.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [1985] EWCA Civ 18, the appeal against the assessment of damages was dismissed.
2. High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division: Kilner Brown J assessed damages on 8 July 1983 at £323,050, plus agreed interest of £4,867.