Wheeler v Leicester City Council

A local authority may consider the promotion of good race relations when exercising its statutory functions. It must nevertheless exercise its powers fairly and for proper purposes.

A public authority cannot compel a private organisation to endorse its policy on a lawful and controversial issue by threatening sanctions. Nor may statutory property-management powers be used to punish an organisation which has committed no wrong. A decision reached through such illegitimate pressure is reviewable for procedural unfairness and misuse of power.

Leicester City Council barred Leicester Football Club from using a municipal recreation ground for 12 months. The club had declined to condemn a Rugby Football Union tour of South Africa or to discourage its members from participating on the council's terms, although it opposed apartheid and had circulated arguments against the tour.

Forbes J refused judicial review. The Court of Appeal, by a majority, dismissed the club's appeal, Browne-Wilkinson LJ dissenting: [1985] 2 All E.R. 151. The club appealed to the House of Lords. The central issues were whether section 71 of the Race Relations Act 1976 permitted the council to consider race relations and whether the ban was nevertheless unlawful because of unfairness, irrationality or misuse of statutory power.

1. Appeal allowed unanimously. Lord Roskill and Lord Templeman gave the substantive speeches. Lord Bridge of Harwich, Lord Brightman and Lord Griffiths agreed with both. The council's decision of 21 August 1984 was quashed by certiorari.

2. Per Lord Roskill, section 71 of the Race Relations Act 1976 was not confined to a local authority's internal conduct. It required appropriate arrangements so that the authority's various functions were exercised with due regard to eliminating unlawful racial discrimination and promoting equality of opportunity and good relations between racial groups. The council could therefore consider race relations when exercising its statutory powers concerning open spaces and recreation grounds.

3. Per Lord Roskill, that statutory competence did not place the council's decision beyond judicial review. The recognised grounds of illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety were neither exhaustive nor necessarily mutually exclusive, following Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 WLR 1174.

4. Per Lord Roskill, a public authority may use persuasion, including powerful persuasion, to advance a legitimate policy. On a controversial issue where lawful opposing views may sincerely be held, it acts unfairly when persuasion becomes illegitimate pressure backed by threatened sanctions. The council demanded affirmative answers to four questions and rejected the club's reasoned, lawful and substantially supportive response. Its method of obtaining compliance was procedurally unfair.

5. Lord Roskill was also disposed to regard the council's action as unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense, although he rested his decision on unfairness. His conclusion on irrationality was therefore an alternative and non-essential view.

6. Per Lord Templeman, the club had committed no wrong. A private person or organisation cannot be required to display zeal for a public authority's objective or to publish views dictated by it. The council misused its statutory property-management powers by withdrawing longstanding facilities to punish the club for declining to adopt the council's position. This reasoning applied the approach in Congreve v Home Office [1976] 1 Q.B. 629.

7. The Court of Appeal's order was set aside and the matter remitted to the Queen's Bench Division, with liberty to seek further relief necessary to protect the club's rights. The council was ordered to pay the club's costs in the House and in both courts below.

1. House of Lords: The appeal was allowed unanimously. The Court of Appeal's order was set aside, the council's decision was quashed, and the case was remitted to the Queen's Bench Division.

2. Court of Appeal: On 14 March 1985 the court, by a majority, dismissed the club's appeal; Browne-Wilkinson LJ dissented: [1985] 2 All E.R. 151.

3. Queen's Bench Division: On 27 September 1984 Forbes J refused the club's application for judicial review.