Wilson v Pringle

Battery requires intentional touching or contact which the plaintiff proves to be hostile. The touching must be intentional; an intention to cause injury is unnecessary. Hostility is a question of fact and may arise from the circumstances. It does not mean ill-will or malevolence.

Some deliberate contacts of everyday life are innocent and fall outside battery even without actual or implied consent. Generally acceptable conduct helps explain that protection, but does not provide a complete practical definition of battery. Where the touching itself does not demonstrate hostility, the plaintiff should plead the circumstances relied upon. Disputed questions concerning the incident and hostility require investigation at trial and may preclude summary judgment.

Peter Wilson and Ian Pringle were schoolboys aged 13 when Wilson fell at school and injured his hip. Wilson alleged that Pringle intentionally jumped on him. He claimed damages for trespass to the person and negligence. Pringle denied jumping on Wilson and alleged that he pulled Wilson's school bag from his shoulder during ordinary horseplay.

The District Registrar refused Wilson permission to enter summary judgment. On Wilson's appeal, Judge Wilson-Mellor QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, granted judgment for damages to be assessed. Pringle had admitted that pulling the bag caused Wilson to fall and apparently suffer injury. The judge treated that admission, together with the absence of pleaded consent or justification, as establishing battery.

Pringle appealed. The central issues were whether battery required an intention to injure, whether intentional contact without consent or justification necessarily established liability, and whether factual questions remained for trial.

Appeal allowed. Croom-Johnson LJ delivered the judgment of the court, comprising O'Connor, Croom-Johnson and Balcombe LJJ. Pringle was given unconditional leave to defend.

1. Battery required intentional touching or contact. The intention related to the act of touching, rather than its injurious consequences. An intention to injure was unnecessary. The passages relied upon from Fowler v Lanning and Letang v Cooper addressed unintentional contact and did not establish the contrary proposition.

2. The plaintiff also had to prove that the touching was hostile. The older authorities established that intentional contact alone was insufficient. Williams v Humphrey correctly rejected an intention-to-injure requirement, but its reasoning stopped short by treating an intentional, unjustified act as sufficient without addressing hostility.

3. Hostility was a factual question. It could arise from words, gestures, the act itself or its surrounding circumstances. It did not mean ill-will or malevolence. Unlawfully restraining someone contrary to their legal rights could constitute hostile touching, as the circumstances of Collins v Wilcock illustrated. Where the immediate touching did not itself demonstrate hostility, the plaintiff should plead the facts relied upon.

4. The rationalisation in Collins v Wilcock usefully explained why generally acceptable contacts of daily life fell outside battery. Such contacts did not invariably depend upon actual or implied consent. Nevertheless, unacceptable everyday contact was not a practicable complete definition of battery. Consent and lawful justifications remained relevant. By way of further guidance, an urgent operation on an unconscious patient could be explained through ordinary acceptability rather than fictional consent. Appropriate allowances might also be required for childhood and individual characteristics.

5. Summary judgment in personal injury actions was rare. The judge had taken too narrow a view of what established trespass to the person. Questions requiring evidence remained, and the negligence claim also required factual investigation, including foreseeability. The court invited submissions on further directions. Costs were awarded here and below, with enforcement requiring a further court order.

• Court of Appeal: In Wilson v Pringle [1986] EWCA Civ 6, reported at [1987] QB 237 , allowed the defendant's appeal and granted unconditional leave to defend.
• High Court, Queen's Bench Division, Walsall District Registry: Judge Wilson-Mellor QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, allowed the plaintiff's appeal from the District Registrar and granted summary judgment for damages to be assessed.
• District Registrar: Refused the plaintiff leave to enter summary judgment.