Wilson v Pringle

Battery requires intentional contact, not intentional injury. The contact must also be hostile, but hostility does not mean ill-will or a desire to cause harm; it is assessed from the act and surrounding circumstances. Contact generally accepted in the ordinary conduct of daily life is not actionable, although that exception is not itself a complete definition of battery. Where the contact does not reveal hostility, the claimant must plead facts supporting it. Questions of hostility, justification, consent, horseplay and childhood may require evidence, so summary judgment is inappropriate where material factual issues remain.

The plaintiff and defendant were both 13-year-old schoolboys. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant jumped on him, causing a fall and hip injury. The defence denied this and alternatively pleaded that the defendant had pulled the plaintiff’s sports bag in ordinary horseplay, after which the plaintiff fell. Following an admission that the bag had been pulled and the plaintiff had fallen, the deputy High Court judge gave judgment for the plaintiff under Order 14 rule 3, treating the pleaded case as an admission of battery without arguable consent or justification. The appeal concerned whether the admitted conduct established battery or whether issues of intentional contact, hostility and justification required a trial.

Appeal allowed. The judgment of the court held that the deputy judge had taken too narrow a view of the matters required to establish trespass to the person.

1. Negligence and battery. The distinction between negligence and trespass must be maintained. In personal injury cases, contact in negligence is ordinarily unintended, whereas battery requires deliberate contact. An unintended accident must be pursued, if at all, in negligence.
2. Intention. It is the act of touching, not the injury, which must be intentional. An intention to injure is unnecessary. The court explained the proper scope of Fowler v Lanning (1959) 1 QB 426 and Letang v Cooper (1965) 1 QB 232 in reaching that conclusion.
3. Hostility. Battery also requires hostile touching. Hostility is not confined to anger, ill-will or malevolence, and cannot be determined solely by the defendant’s expressed intention. It is a question of fact, inferred from the act and its circumstances. The older authorities, including Tuberville v Savage (1669) 1 Mod. 3 and Cole v Turner (1704) 6 Mod 149, supported that approach.
4. Ordinary contact. The general exception for physical contact generally acceptable in ordinary daily life explains why many everyday contacts are not batteries. The court approved the rationalisation in Collins v Wilcock (1984) 1 WLR 1172, but stated that the exception was not a practical stand-alone definition of battery.
5. Application. The pleadings and evidence left issues as to the character of the bag-pulling, horseplay, consent, justification and the circumstances of the fall. Those matters required investigation in evidence. The appeal was allowed with unconditional leave to defend. Costs were awarded here and below, subject to enforcement only by order of the court, with legal aid taxation.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): allowed the appeal and gave unconditional leave to defend, with costs here and below subject to the court’s order.
• High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division: His Honour Judge Wilson-Mellor QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, gave judgment for the plaintiff under Order 14 rule 3, with damages to be assessed.