R v Steer (Steer, In re)

For aggravated criminal damage under section 1(2)(b) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971, the prosecution must prove that danger to life resulted from the destruction of or damage to property. It is insufficient that the defendant’s act both damaged property and independently endangered life.

The required causal connection exists in an ordinary arson case because the ensuing conflagration, as the property burns, creates the danger. Any ambiguity in a penal statute must be resolved in favour of the defendant, although the provision in this case was unambiguous.

The respondent fired three rifle shots at the bungalow of his former business partner. One shot was aimed at a bedroom window occupied by the partner and his wife. The respondent was prosecuted for firearms offences and criminal damage, including aggravated criminal damage under section 1(2) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971.

The trial judge ruled that section 1(2)(b) covered danger caused by the act which damaged the property, even though the damage itself caused no danger. The respondent then pleaded guilty. The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) allowed his appeal and certified whether danger to life must result from the property damage or could instead result from the act causing that damage. The Crown appealed to the House of Lords.

1. Appeal dismissed unanimously. Lord Bridge of Harwich delivered the leading speech. Lord Griffiths, Lord Ackner, Lord Oliver of Aylmerton and Lord Goff of Chieveley agreed with his reasons and proposed answer to the certified question.

2. Per Lord Bridge, section 1(2) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 creates an aggravated form of the section 1(1) offence. Besides proving intentional or reckless damage to property, the prosecution must prove that the accused intended life to be endangered by that damage or was reckless whether life would thereby be endangered. The words “by the destruction or damage” and “thereby” require a causal connection between the property damage and the danger to life.

3. The statutory language could not bear the Crown’s proposed meaning of danger caused either by the damage or by the act causing it. That construction would make the causal words surplusage and would effectively create a general offence of intentionally or recklessly endangering life whenever incidental property damage occurred. It would also produce irrational disparities between offenders according to whether their dangerous acts happened to cause trifling damage.

4. Per Lord Bridge, ordinary arson falls within section 1(2). The inflammatory agent starts the fire, but the danger arises from the ensuing conflagration as the building is damaged or destroyed. Danger from the heat, flames or smoke of a burning building may therefore result from damage to the building.

5. Reg. v Hardie [1985] 1 WLR 64 concerned the effect of self-administered tranquillisers on the accused’s state of mind, not causation. Its description of an act creating risks to property and life could not determine an issue to which the court in that case had not directed its mind. Judicial language, especially on statutory construction, must be read in context.

6. The Court of Appeal’s order was affirmed. The certified question was answered by declaring that danger to life must result from the destruction of or damage to property; danger resulting only from the defendant’s damaging act is insufficient. The cause was remitted to the Court of Appeal to proceed consistently with the House’s judgment.

1. House of Lords: The Crown’s appeal was dismissed unanimously. The Court of Appeal’s order was affirmed, the certified question was answered in the respondent’s favour, and the cause was remitted to the Court of Appeal.
2. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Neill LJ, Peter Pain J and Gatehouse J allowed the respondent’s appeal against conviction and certified a question of law of general public importance.
3. Lincoln Crown Court: The judge rejected a submission of no case to answer on the aggravated criminal damage count. Following that ruling, the respondent changed his plea to guilty.