Wenton, R. v

An offence under section 1(2) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 requires that the danger to life arise from the destruction or damage to property. It is insufficient that danger arises from the defendant’s separate act which caused, preceded or followed the damage.

A course of conduct does not cure that causal defect. Where the charged damage was to a window, a later act of throwing a petrol container into the premises could not make the window damage an offence under section 1(2), although the later act might disclose another offence.

The appellant was convicted at Liverpool Crown Court of five counts of damaging a window while reckless as to whether the lives of the occupants would thereby be endangered, contrary to section 1(2) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971. He had smashed a window with a brick, after which a petrol container and lit paper were thrown through it. The petrol did not ignite.

He appealed against conviction. The issue was whether the subsequent danger created by the petrol container could satisfy the statutory requirement that life be endangered by the damage charged in the indictment, namely the damage to the window.

1. Appeal allowed. The convictions under section 1(2) could not stand. The indictment identified the actus reus as damage to a window. It therefore required proof that the occupants’ lives were endangered by that damage.

2. Applying Steer [1988] AC 111, the court held that section 1(2) distinguishes danger caused by property damage from danger caused by the act which produced that damage. The statutory words do not extend the aggravated offence to a risk arising merely from the defendant’s act.

3. The brick caused the charged window damage. That damage did not itself threaten anyone inside the house. The subsequent throwing of the petrol container and lit paper created the alleged danger, but was a separate act. It could not supply the required connection between the charged damage and the danger to life.

4. The Crown’s reliance on a single course of conduct failed. The authorities concerning danger flowing from broken glass or damage to a railway carriage did not qualify the principle in Steer; in those cases the damage itself could endanger life. This case was materially different.

5. The court also noted that, because the alleged endangerment had been put as arising from fire, section 1(3) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 should have been considered. The case had proceeded on an inaccurate premise. The convictions were quashed, without determining what other offence or offences the facts might have disclosed.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Allowed the appellant’s appeal against conviction and quashed the five convictions under section 1(2) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971.
• Crown Court at Liverpool: The appellant was convicted on 11 December 2009 and sentenced on 4 February 2010.