Westminster City Council v Croyalgrange Ltd

An offence under paragraph 20(1)(a) of Schedule 3 to the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982 requires proof that the defendant knew that premises were being used as a sex establishment in contravention of the statutory prohibition. An honest belief in facts which, if true, would make the use lawful is therefore a defence.

The prosecution retains the burden of proving knowledge beyond reasonable doubt. Once unlawful use and the other elements are proved, knowledge may ordinarily be inferred unless evidence suggests an honest mistake. The prosecution must then exclude that belief beyond reasonable doubt. Knowledge may also be inferred from deliberately closing one’s eyes to the obvious or avoiding inquiry through fear of confirming a suspicion.

The respondent company owned premises which its sub-tenant used as a sex establishment. No licence had been granted and no timely application attracting transitional protection had been made. The company and its director contended that they honestly believed such an application was pending.

A metropolitan stipendiary magistrate acquitted them because the prosecution had not proved beyond reasonable doubt that they knew the use was unlawful. The Divisional Court, reported at [1985] 1 All ER 740, dismissed the council’s appeal by case stated.

The council appealed to the House of Lords. The central issue was whether paragraph 20(1)(a) of Schedule 3 to the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982 required proof that the defendant knew the use contravened paragraph 6.

1. Appeal dismissed unanimously. Lord Bridge of Harwich delivered the leading speech. Lord Brightman agreed expressly, and Lord Mackay of Clashfern, Lord Ackner and Lord Oliver of Aylmerton agreed with Lord Bridge’s reasons. The Divisional Court’s order was affirmed. The certified question was amended to ask whether the prosecution must prove knowledge that the use contravened paragraph 6, and was answered affirmatively.

2. Per Lord Bridge, paragraph 20(1)(a) requires knowledge both of the use as a sex establishment and that the use contravenes paragraph 6 of Schedule 3 to the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982. Applying “knowingly” merely to the nature of the use would make the word tautologous. Clear language is required to create strict criminal liability, and the repeated use of “knowingly” could not signify that intention.

3. Per Lord Bridge, prosecution under paragraph 20(1)(a) is confined to cases where no licence has been granted. Otherwise the prosecution could use that provision to deprive a licensee of the reasonable-excuse defence expressly available under paragraph 20(1)(c) for breach of a licence condition.

4. Per Lord Bridge, section 101 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 did not transfer the burden to the defendants. The statutory exceptions qualified the paragraph 6 prohibition rather than the offence created by paragraph 20(1)(a). The prosecution therefore had to prove knowledge beyond reasonable doubt.

5. Per Lord Bridge, once the prosecution proves the unlawful use, the defendant’s participation, and the absence of a licence, waiver or protected pending application, knowledge may ordinarily be inferred. If evidence suggests an honest belief that the use was licensed, waived or protected by a pending application, the defendant must be acquitted unless the prosecution excludes that belief beyond reasonable doubt. Lord Brightman expressly adopted the same analysis.

6. Per Lord Bridge, the reasonableness of the asserted belief is not an additional requirement. Knowledge may nevertheless be found where the defendant deliberately closed his eyes to the obvious or avoided inquiry because he suspected the truth and did not want confirmation. The magistrate had applied the correct approach and could not be faulted.

1. House of Lords: Dismissed the council’s appeal unanimously, affirmed the Divisional Court’s order, amended the certified question and answered it affirmatively.

2. Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench Division: Robert Goff LJ and McCullough J dismissed the council’s appeal by case stated on 29 November 1984 and certified a point of law of general public importance: [1985] 1 All ER 740.

3. Bow Street Magistrates’ Court: The metropolitan stipendiary magistrate acquitted the company and its director because the requisite knowledge had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.