Coventry City Council v Vassell

For the criminal offence of failing to notify a change affecting benefit entitlement, the prosecution must prove every statutory ingredient beyond reasonable doubt. The claimant must know that the change would, rather than merely could, affect entitlement. The requirement to give prompt notification in the prescribed manner also imports mens rea: the claimant must knowingly fail to notify the prescribed person in the prescribed manner. The notification instructions must be expressed clearly enough for the claimant to understand them. Whether notice was prompt, whether the instructions were sufficiently clear, and whether the claimant possessed the necessary knowledge are questions of fact. A notification to a different public body is insufficient unless the statutory scheme requires information to be transferred or the body has undertaken to transfer it.

The Council appealed by way of case stated from the decision of Coventry Magistrates’ Court acquitting Neil Vassell of an offence under section 112(1A) of the Social Security Administration Act 1992. The charge concerned his alleged failure, between 29 October 2007 and 5 July 2009, promptly to notify a change in circumstances affecting housing benefit and council tax benefit, namely his receipt of student finance.

The magistrates found that Mr Vassell notified the Job Centre of his change to full-time education, believed that this notified the Council, and was not given sufficiently clear instructions about how or where changes affecting his local-authority benefits had to be reported. The questions stated for the court concerned the meaning of prompt notification, the prescribed person and manner, the effect of notification to a Jobcentre Plus, and the mental elements required by section 112(1A).

1. Appeal dismissed. The prosecution had failed to prove that Mr Vassell knew that becoming a full-time student would affect his entitlement. Knowledge that the change might affect entitlement was sufficient for the general notification duty, but not for section 112(1A)(c), which required knowledge that it would affect entitlement.

2. “Prompt” had its natural and ordinary meaning. Whether notification was prompt was a question of fact for the magistrates. There was no legal requirement that notification be given before the change took effect.

3. The prescribed person was the local authority administering the relevant benefit. The prescribed manner was written notification to the office designated on the benefit claim form for receipt of benefit claims. A Jobcentre Plus was not obliged to pass information to the Council in the absence of a statutory obligation or an unequivocal undertaking to do so.

4. The presumption that a truly criminal offence requires mens rea was not rebutted. Section 112(1A)(d) therefore required a knowing failure, not mere non-notification. The claimant had to be aware both of the person to whom notification had to be made and of the manner in which it had to be made.

5. The authority had to provide clear information about the notification requirements. Whether the information was sufficiently clear, and whether the claimant nevertheless knew the requirements, were matters for the tribunal of fact. Deliberately shutting one’s eyes to the obvious or refraining from inquiry could support a finding of knowledge.

6. The magistrates were entitled to find that the forms were insufficiently clear and that Mr Vassell had not knowingly failed to notify the Council. His acquittal was therefore upheld.

The appeal was brought by way of case stated from the acquittal by Coventry Magistrates’ Court on 1 September 2010. The Administrative Court dismissed the Council’s appeal.