Leech v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison (Prevot v Deputy Governor of Long Lartin Prison)

A prison governor’s adjudication of a disciplinary charge is subject to judicial review. The governor exercises an independent statutory power affecting a prisoner’s liberty, status and legitimate expectations. Reviewability depends on the nature and consequences of the decision, rather than its description as administrative, managerial or disciplinary.

The Secretary of State’s supervisory duty and power to remit or mitigate punishment provide an alternative remedy. They do not exclude the court’s jurisdiction, although an adequate alternative remedy may influence the court’s discretion. Judicial review can be excluded only by clear statutory provision. Concerns about prison management cannot justify a judicially created exclusion; any such restriction is for Parliament.

These conjoined appeals concerned disciplinary adjudications by deputy prison governors. Mr Leech lost 28 days’ remission after proceedings which the Secretary of State accepted had prejudiced his defence. The punishment was remitted, but the finding of guilt remained on his prison record because the Secretary of State considered that he lacked power to quash it.

Mr Prevot lost 21 days’ remission and six days’ associated work. He alleged that he had wrongly been prevented from calling his wife and fellow prisoners as witnesses. The Secretary of State declined to intervene.

The Court of Appeal granted leave in each case but dismissed the substantive applications because it was bound by Regina v Deputy Governor of Camphill Prison, Ex parte King [1985] Q.B. 735. The central question was whether the High Court had jurisdiction to review a prison governor’s disciplinary adjudication directly.

1. Disposition. The House unanimously allowed both appeals. Lord Bridge of Harwich and Lord Oliver of Aylmerton delivered the principal speeches. Lord Fraser of Tullybelton and Lord Brandon of Oakbrook agreed with both; Lord Ackner also allowed the appeals. Mr Leech’s adjudication was quashed. Mr Prevot’s application was remitted to the Queen’s Bench Division for determination on its merits.

2. Reviewability of the governor’s adjudication. Per Lord Bridge and Lord Oliver, a governor adjudicating a disciplinary charge exercises an independent statutory public power under the Prison Rules 1964. The decision can affect a prisoner’s liberty, status and legitimate expectation of remission. It must therefore comply with natural justice and is amenable to judicial review. The result does not depend on whether the function is labelled administrative, managerial, disciplinary, judicial or quasi-judicial.

3. No principled distinction from a board of visitors. The governor and a board of visitors perform substantially the same adjudicatory function under the disciplinary code. Differences in speed, formality, seriousness and available punishment are matters of degree. They do not justify review of a board’s adjudication while excluding review of a governor’s decision. Regina v Deputy Governor of Camphill Prison, Ex parte King [1985] Q.B. 735 was accordingly overruled. The reasoning of Shaw L.J. in Regina v Board of Visitors of Hull Prison, Ex parte St. Germain [1979] Q.B. 425 and the approach of the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal in Regina v Governor of the Maze Prison, Ex parte McKiernan were approved.

4. Secretary of State and alternative remedies. Section 4(2) of the Prison Act 1952 did not place disciplinary adjudications in a self-contained system immune from direct review. The Secretary of State could not direct how a governor should adjudicate. Rule 56(1) permitted remission or mitigation of an award but did not authorise quashing the finding of guilt. A petition was therefore not always an adequate remedy, especially where procedural unfairness raised disputed facts. In any event, an alternative remedy concerns the exercise of discretion, not the existence of jurisdiction.

5. Ouster and public policy. Per Lord Bridge and Lord Oliver, jurisdiction over a recognised public-law wrong can be excluded only by clear express statutory provision. Predicted inconvenience, frivolous claims or possible harm to prison discipline could not support a judicially created exclusion. The courts could control unmeritorious applications through leave and remedial discretion. Any broader exclusion was a matter for Parliament.

1. House of Lords: In Leech v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison (Prevot v Deputy Governor of Long Lartin Prison) [1988] UKHL 16, [1988] AC 533, the House allowed both appeals unanimously. It reversed the relevant lower-court orders, quashed Mr Leech’s adjudication and remitted Mr Prevot’s application to the Queen’s Bench Division.

2. Court of Appeal: In Mr Leech’s case, the court granted leave on 10 September 1986 but dismissed the substantive application because it was bound by Regina v Deputy Governor of Camphill Prison, Ex parte King [1985] Q.B. 735. In Mr Prevot’s case, it granted leave on 15 June 1987, dismissed the substantive application on the same basis and granted leave to appeal.

3. High Court: Mann J. refused Mr Leech leave to seek judicial review on 22 April 1986. Stuart-Smith J. refused Mr Prevot leave concerning the governor’s adjudication on 18 May 1987, although he granted leave concerning the Secretary of State’s decision.