Rantzen v Mirror Group Newspapers (1986) Ltd

In a libel appeal, the Court of Appeal must subject a large jury award to searching scrutiny. The question is whether a reasonable jury could have regarded the sum as necessary to compensate the claimant and re-establish reputation. The court may reduce an award which is excessive by objective standards of reasonable compensation, necessity and proportionality.

Damages may include vindication, injured feelings, anxiety and aggravation from an unapologetic or persistent defence. Juries should consider purchasing power and proportionality. They may be referred to Court of Appeal awards substituted under section 8, but not to previous jury awards or conventional personal-injury awards.

The claimant, Esther Rantzen, obtained a jury verdict and £250,000 damages for libel against the publishers, editor and journalist responsible for articles in The People. The articles alleged that she had failed to protect children from a teacher whom she knew to pose a sexual risk.

The defendants had pleaded justification and fair comment. They appealed from the Queen's Bench Division, where Otton J had tried the action with a jury. They alleged misdirections in the summing up and contended that the award was excessive and incompatible with proper protection of freedom of expression.

The central issue was the proper appellate standard for reviewing a jury's libel award, and whether the court should substitute a lower award under Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, section 8.

1. Appeal allowed. The court held that the jury's award of £250,000 was excessive and substituted £110,000 under section 8(2) of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 and RSC Order 59 r 11(4).

2. The court, giving a single judgment through Neill LJ, rejected the complaints of misdirection. The trial judge had sufficiently directed the jury on the value of money, partial justification, mitigating matters and the absence of an apology. An absence of apology may increase injury to feelings in an appropriate case. Persistence in a plea of justification or fair comment may also increase compensatory damages because it prolongs and republishes the injury, even though honest persistence is not itself evidence of malice.

3. Article 10 of the Convention was not directly enforceable in domestic law. However, its principles could assist the construction of an ambiguity and the exercise of a discretion. Following the common-law approach reflected in Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109, the court held that restrictions on expression must be no more than proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.

4. The former high barrier to intervention in jury awards required revision. Large awards must receive searching scrutiny. The operative question was whether a reasonable jury could have thought the award necessary both to compensate the claimant and to re-establish reputation. On the facts, a substantial award was justified, but the claimant's continuing successful career and high public regard meant that £250,000 exceeded reasonable compensation and proportionality.

5. For future trials, juries should consider purchasing power, proportionality and the sum necessary for compensation and vindication. Awards substituted by the Court of Appeal under section 8 may be cited as developing a body of guidance. Previous jury awards and conventional personal-injury awards should not be used as comparators. Vindication remains a legitimate element of libel damages.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Allowed the defendants' appeal and substituted damages of £110,000 for the jury's award of £250,000: [1994] QB 670.
• Queen's Bench Division: Otton J and a jury awarded the claimant £250,000 damages for libel. The citation of that decision is not stated in the judgment.