Smith v Cribben

A driver proceeding normally at a proper speed and on a proper course is not ordinarily negligent merely because a following driver attempts a dangerous overtaking manoeuvre. The driver ahead is not generally required to anticipate dangerous driving by the following driver or to extricate that driver from a danger of the following driver’s own making. Maintaining a known and steady speed may be safer than making an unpredictable alteration of speed. Where the following driver persists in late overtaking and then brakes or swerves, liability depends on whether the driver ahead’s conduct materially caused the collision. On the facts, the respondent’s driving created and perpetuated the danger, while the appellant’s steady driving neither caused nor materially contributed to the accident.

The appeal arose from contribution proceedings following two actions concerning a collision on the Snodland Bypass. The respondent, driving north, attempted to overtake the appellant near the end of a dual carriageway. Her car crossed onto the incorrect side of the road and collided with an oncoming vehicle. The appellant’s car was travelling ahead in the nearside lane.

The High Court found the respondent partly responsible but also held that the appellant had contributed by failing to react appropriately, including by maintaining his speed. The respondent’s claim against the appellant and the related contribution proceedings were therefore in issue. The central questions were whether the appellant’s conduct was negligent and causative, and whether the respondent was solely responsible for the collision.

1. Appeal allowed unanimously. The Court of Appeal set aside the orders below, declared the respondent solely liable for the accident, dismissed her action against the appellant and the third-party proceedings, and made consequential costs orders.

2. Roch LJ rejected the technical pleading objection. Although the trial judge had rejected the respondent’s primary pleaded case, the findings relied upon were in substance covered by particulars (b) and (i) of paragraph 1 of the amended statement of claim.

3. The substantive finding against the appellant could not stand. The trial judge’s conclusion that the vehicles were abreast before the hatched area, and that the appellant had looked directly at the respondent through his window, was not supported by the evidence accepted on appeal. The proper inference was that the respondent attempted to overtake at a very late stage, achieved only a small overlap near the commencement of the hatching, then dropped back and braked and swerved, losing control.

4. The ordinary reasonable driver’s duty is to drive normally, at a proper speed and on a proper course. A driver is not generally obliged to anticipate that a following driver will drive dangerously, or to extricate that driver from a dangerous situation which the following driver has created. In the circumstances, the appellant’s failure to slow down, and his continuation at a known and steady speed, could not be criticised as negligent. Altering speed might itself have increased the risk of collision.

5. The respondent had created the danger by attempting a late overtaking manoeuvre and had persisted in it when the safe course was to slow down and fall behind. No sufficient causal link was established between the appellant’s manner of driving and the collision. Nolan LJ agreed with Roch LJ, and Dillon LJ also agreed.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court orders, and declared the respondent solely liable.
2. High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division (Otton J) found that the respondent and appellant had contributed to the accident and made orders giving rise to the appeals. The citation of that decision was not stated in the judgment.