R v City of London Corpn, Ex parte Matson (Matson, Ex parte)

A confirming body may assess both positive and negative factors when deciding whether to approve a candidate elected to public office. The election is relevant but not decisive, and the decision remains subject to limited judicial review for irrationality.

There is no general administrative duty to give reasons. Fairness may imply such a duty where the nature of the decision and process makes explanation necessary. A public rejection of an elected candidate by a court of record required short reasons, particularly because it affected reputation, future candidature and electors, while reasons would assist lawful and disciplined decision-making.

Mr Malcolm Matson was elected alderman for the Ward of Bread Street by 54 votes to 15. The Court of Aldermen, exercising its customary confirmation power, rejected his admission by 17 votes to 1 after a private conference and questioning. No petition to reject him had been presented, and the Court gave no reasons.

Latham J dismissed the application for judicial review and refused leave to appeal. The Court of Appeal granted leave. The appeal concerned the scope of the confirmation power, procedural fairness, irrationality, and whether the Court of Aldermen was required to give reasons for its decision.

Lord Justice Neill delivered the leading judgment. Lord Justice Swinton Thomas agreed, adding observations on procedural fairness, and Lord Justice Waite agreed. The appeal was unanimously allowed.

1. Nature of the confirmation power. The aldermanic election was a two-stage process. The Court of Aldermen could consider both positive and negative factors relevant to suitability, including experience, attainments, personality and character. The ward election was relevant but not decisive. The power was a broad discretionary judgment of fitness and was not limited to rejecting a candidate only where a specific adverse case had been proved. This approach was consistent with R v Johnson (1839) 6 CL. & FIN. 413 and R v The Mayor and Aldermen of London, ex parte Scales [1832] 3 B & Ad 255.
2. Rationality. The Court would not interfere unless the power had been exercised capriciously or without any reasonable basis. The refusal was not ex facie unreasonable merely because Mr Matson had won the ward election. The Aldermen were entitled to rely on their own assessment during the questioning.
3. Procedural fairness. The process was not accusatory because no petition had been presented and the Court was assessing suitability rather than determining an allegation. On the information available, procedural unfairness could not be established. Swinton Thomas LJ added that, if a factual allegation played a real part in the decision, fairness would require notice and a proper opportunity to answer it.
4. Duty to give reasons. Although no general duty to give reasons existed, such a duty could be implied where fairness required it. The assessment depended on the nature of the decision, the decision-making body and the relevant statutory or customary framework, applying principles discussed in Lloyd v McMahon [1987] AC 625, R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Doody [1994] 1 AC 531, R v Higher Education Funding Council [1994] 1 WLR 242 and R v Civil Service Appeal Board, ex parte Cunningham [1992] ICR 816.
5. Fairness required short reasons here. The candidate had been elected through a statutory democratic process recognised by section 191(1) of the Representation of the People Act 1983. The Court of Aldermen was a court of record, the rejection was public, and it affected reputation, future candidature and the electors. Reasons would also assist the Court to make sound and manifestly just decisions without frustrating its customary power. The Court did not need to decide the Convention argument under Article 6 or the separate question whether reasons had to be supplied to the reviewing court.
6. Order. The decision of 6 December 1994 was quashed. The matter was remitted to the Court of Aldermen to reconsider Mr Matson’s approval and reach a reasoned decision in accordance with the Court of Appeal’s findings.

• Court of Appeal ([1995] EWCA Civ 56): allowed the appeal, quashed the Court of Aldermen’s decision and remitted the matter for reconsideration.
• High Court: Latham J dismissed the application for judicial review on 16 March 1995 and refused leave to appeal. The Court of Appeal subsequently granted leave.