Geenty v Channel Four Television Corporation & Anor

At the leave stage in a defamation claim, a court should not resolve a disputed distinction between pleaded meanings under Order 82, rule (3)(a) where the distinction is reasonably arguable and depends on viewing a broadcast as a whole. Whether the claimant was personally implicated in both alleged meanings may then be a question for the jury. A gap between earlier allegations in the programme and a later reference to the claimant may not justify removing that issue from the jury if the distinction is insufficiently clear. Granting leave does not indicate that the appeal will succeed.

Mr Patrick Paul Geenty, a police officer, sued Channel Four Television Corporation and David Jessel over a programme concerning the treatment and care of Mr Wiltshire in police custody. He pleaded meanings that he had probably savagely beaten Mr Wiltshire and that he had seriously neglected his care, causing or contributing to his death. Mr Justice May held under Order 82, rule (3)(a) that the programme was capable of bearing the neglect meaning but not the beating meaning, because the later references to Mr Geenty were too remote from earlier allusions to ill-treatment. After a single judge refused leave, Mr Geenty renewed the application. The central issue was whether that distinction was sufficiently clear for summary determination or should be left to a jury viewing the relevant parts of the programme as a whole.

The renewed application for leave to appeal was allowed. Lord Justice Hirst gave the substantive reasons, and Lord Justice Judge agreed.

1. The pleaded meanings alleged, respectively, that Mr Geenty had probably savagely beaten Mr Wiltshire in custody and that he had gravely neglected Mr Wiltshire’s care, causing or contributing to his death.
2. Mr Justice May had held that the programme was capable of bearing the second meaning. He considered that the earlier material concerning possible ill-treatment was separated from the later references to Mr Geenty by intervening material concerning police neglect and failures to observe regulations. That discontinuity, in his view, prevented the first meaning from being attributed to Mr Geenty.
3. Lord Justice Hirst held that the distinction was at least reasonably arguable and was not sufficiently clear to justify determination under Order 82, rule (3)(a). The relevant parts of the programme should be viewed as a whole. It was therefore for the jury to decide whether Mr Geenty was personally implicated in both pleaded meanings, rather than only in the allegation of neglect.
4. The court granted leave but stressed that the applicant should not assume that the appeal would succeed. The order was: application allowed; costs in the appeal.

• High Court, Queen’s Bench Division: Mr Justice May ruled under Order 82, rule (3)(a) that the programme was capable of bearing the pleaded neglect meaning but not the pleaded beating meaning.
• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Following refusal of leave by a single judge, the renewed application was allowed and leave to appeal was granted: [1996] EWCA Civ 1218.